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YOUNG,   LOWELL THOMAS.     The   Impeachment and  Trial   of Governor William W. 
Holden,   1870-1871.     (1965)   Directed  by:     Richard   Bardolph. pp.   92. 
William Woods   Holden,   in spite   of his   illegitimate birth   into an 
environment of   ignorance  and  poverty,   became  one  of  the most   influential 
figures  of North Carolina history.     He was  a  key  figure   in the  politics 
of his  state  from  the   time  he   became   the editor of  the   North Carolina 
Standard   in   1843  until   1871.     The   Standard   became   the most   influential 
paper   in  the  state,   and  he  was chiefly responsible   for   shaping three 
political   parties   in  North Carolina --   the  Democratic,   Conservative,   and 
Republican.     Holden  led  the  peace movement   in the  state  during  the Civil 
War,   and,   as a result,   was  appointed   Provisional Governor   in  1865. 
Holden's  ultimate  ambition was   to be   the duly elected  governor  of 
North Carolina,   and   in   1868,   after a  number  of defeats,   he  achieved   this 
goal.     Holden,  who was  now the   leader  of   the Radical   Republicans   in   the 
state,   had  been elected by  the  Negro  vote.     The conservative element   in 
the state determined   to destroy  Holden  in order  to overthrow the Repub- 
lican Party and  restore white  supremacy.     The activities   of   the  Ku  Klux 
Klan  became so violent  in certain parts  of  the  state   that  the Governor was 
forced   to  resort  to the  use  of martial   law to restore   order.     This   "War" 
with the  Klan led directly  to his   impeachment. 
The August,   1870 election sealed Governor Holden's   fate.     The   state 
legislature,  which had   been predominantly  Republican,   went Conservative 
by a more   than two-thirds  majority.     A caucus of  Conservatives   now deter- 
mined   to remove Governor   Holden  from office at  once.     Eight Articles  of 
Impeachment were   adopted   by  the   House   of Representatives  on December   19, 
1870. The  forty-four  day   impeachment   trial   proper  began on January  23, 
1871, and the vote which removed  Holden from office was   taken on March 22. 
This work,   which  is  an analysis  of  the   impeachment  and trial,   gives 
special   reference   to the   impeachment charges.     The most  serious of   the 
charges was   that Governor Holden had  declared  an unlawful  state of   insur- 
rection in the counties  of Alamance  and Caswell.     Almost  as   important was 
the  charge  that  the  persons  arrested at   the Governor's order had been 
denied  the  procedural   rights  guaranteed  by  the  state  constitution,   espec- 
ially  the writ  of  habeas  corpus.     Less  significant charges were  that  the 
Governor  had employed  an unlawful  army in Alamance and  Caswell  counties; 
he  had  allowed maltreatment of  the  prisoners  arrested  by  this   band;   he 
had  issued an unlawful   warrant  to draw money   from the  state  treasury  to 
support  this  army;   and  he had evaded a court  order forbidding  the dis- 
bursement  of  the  funds. 
The  reasons   for William Holden's   impeachment were  political   and 
social.     The   list of  charges   in the Articles   of  Impeachment were  intro- 
duced   as a rationalization to  justify the overthrow of  the Holden admin- 
istration;   the  real  reason  for   impeachment being  the  Republican assault 
upon white  supremacy.     The   partisan-political   nature of  the entire  pro- 
ceedings   is  an undisputed  fact which was most  apparent   in the   final   bal- 
loting.     The   thirty-six Conservatives  present voted  unanimously for re- 
moval   from office;   the  thirteen Republicans  voted to a man for acquittal. 
Holden,  who had   served  his  state well,   was  unjustly   impeached,   removed 
from office,   and disqualified   from ever  again holding public   office   in 
the   state.     Unfortunately,   he   never   lived   to  see  his  name vindicated. 
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PREFACE 
William Woods   Holden was chiefly responsible   for shaping  three 
political   parties   in North Carolina —   the  Democratic,   Conservative,   and 
Republican.     He was  a key  figure during both the Civil  War  period  and  the 
Reconstruction era.     He  is   important  in  national   history  for his  reputa- 
tion as  a "scalawag",   and  because  he was   the   first  state  governor  to be 
removed   from office  by   impeachment.     He was,   in addition,   the   first  of 
the  Reconstruction governors   to be   impeached ,   and   the   only one   to be con- 
victed.     It   is   because   Holden's   impeachment was  so  important,   and  because 
no  adequate  study  has   been made   of  it,   that  this  study  has   been attempted. 
The work   is  an analysis  of  the   impeachment and  trial ,   with special 
reference  to the   impeachment charges.     Holden  is  perhaps  the most contro- 
versial   figure   in North Carolina history.     A great deal  of  what  has   been 
written about him  is  polemical,   and   it   is  only with great difficulty that 
the  historian can reach a degree of  objectivity.     While  I   have  attempted 
to be detached  and  impartial,  my study of  the  sources  has   led me  to  form 
a more  favorable  opinion of Holden than has  usually been the  case among 
historians. 
My primary source was the voluminous Impeachment Proceedings. Most 
contemporary newspapers ignored the proceedings, but two papers were espec- 
ially useful — The Raleigh Sentinel and The Wilmington Journal. Holden's 
papers (at Duke University) contained little information about the impeach- 
ment and trial, but they did contain a long series of letters that he wrote 
in  1871,  while   in Washington,   D.   C. 
For this   study,   I  wish  to acknowledge  the   invaluable  aid  rendered 
by   the   library  staff  of   the   University of  North Carolina at  Chapel   Hill 
in allowing me   the use   of   their facilities.     I   am also indebted  for  the 
aid,   advice,   and criticism  rendered   by Professor  Richard  Bardolph,   who 
directed   the   study. 
CHAPTER  I 
BIOGRAPHY  TO   1870 
William Woods   Holden was  born near Hillsborough   (later,   Hillsboro), 
North Carolina on November  24,   1818.     His   illegitimate  birth into an environ- 
ment of   ignorance  and  poverty was  always   to be an obstacle   to  the achieve- 
ment of   his   political  ambitions.     Had  his   family background   been more  pres- 
tigious  he  could  doubtless have  gained  political   office  at  a far   lighter 
cost   to himself,   and enjoyed  a thoroughly successful career,   instead of one 
that ended   in impeachment.     As   it was,   Holden always  seemed out  of  place 
among North  Carolina's  aristocracy,   a figure  whom   it could not  quite under- 
stand  and whom it  therefore felt disposed  to  destroy. 
The  youthful   Holden   lived with his mother,   Priscilla Woods,   until 
he was   six  years old,   and was   then sent   to   live with his   father,   Thomas 
Holden,   who operated  a grist mill   in Hillsborough.     There were  ten other 
children  in  the   Holden household,   all  of whom were   later to  sever relations 
with William because  of   his  political  career. 
Holden was   in every respect a self-educated man.     After a formal 
education which was   limited  to one or  two short  terms  at  an "old  field 
school",   be   became,   at  the  age   of  ten,   a "printer's  devil"   to Dennis 
Heartt,   the  editor of   the  Hillsborough Recorder.     It   is   to  Heartt,   the 
state's   foremost Whig editor,   that credit must be  given for  Holden's 
early education and  political  views. 
When he was  a mere  sixteen,   the   young apprentice   left   Hillsborough 
and went   to  Milton,   North Carolina,   where  he  was  employed  by   the  Chronicle. 
After  four months   there,   restlessness  took him to Danville, Virginia,   where 
he wrote  his  first  press  article.    Within a  year he   had  returned   to  Hills- 
borough,  and was  working as  a clerk  in order that he might have  time   to 
study.     He   spent  his   leisure  time,   said one  scholarly authority,   "laying 
the   foundations  of  that  broad culture which ranks  him among the  best   lit- 
erary men the  State  has   produced."* 
Even during  these early years  young Holden had an intense ambition 
to  rise  above his   lower-class background,   and  become  an accomplished  per- 
son.     An anecdote which he   later  told  about his childhood   illustrates   this 
point.     One cold morning when he was   about   twelve  years   old,  Holden was 
invited   into one  of  the  homes   to which  he   delivered  newspapers.     At   the 
table  sat  a well  dressed  young man who was  a student at   the  state univer- 
sity,   an extreme  contrast  to the   ill-clad,   bare-foot newsboy.     "I   looked 
at him,"     said  Holden many years   later,   "and  thought how happy  I  would be 
if  I   had  his opportunities,   and   then I   thought what  a gulf  there   is   between 
us  and how uneven are our chances   in  life.     But  1   determined  then and there 
that  I would keep pace with him in  life's   struggle."2     In  1868 Holden was 
to defeat   this   young student,  Thomas Ashe,   in a campaign  for the  governor- 
ship of  the  state. 
It was   in  1836  that  Holden decided   to move  to Raleigh.     He was  to 
remain there  for the  rest of his   life,   except  for  a short  stay   in Washing- 
ton,   D.   C.     On  the coach to  Raleigh,   he met  Thomas   Sparrow,  the   lawyer who 
was   to manage  his  prosecution,   and William Clark,   a colonel  of  the   special 
troops   Holden was  to employ   in  1870 which  led directly  to his   impeachment. 
*W.   K.   Boyd,   "William W.   Holden,"     Historical   Papers  of  the  Trinity 
College   Historical   Society,   Series   III,   1899,   p.   42. 
2Ibid.,   41. 
Upon arriving   in the  capital  city,  Holden's   poverty  and obscurity 
were exceeded  only by  his ambition.       His writing ability enabled  him  to 
secure  a position with Thomas  Lemay,   the editor of the  Star,  who hired him 
as   a  typesetter,   and   permitted him to  do  some writing for  the  paper.     The 
Star was  a   leading Whig  journal   and  had great   influence   in quarters where 
it was especially desirable  for  a young man  to be  known. 
In  1837  Holden  launched  a newspaper  of his  own,   but   it  proved  un- 
successful  and  he  returned  to  Lemay's  employ.     The   following year  he made 
an unsuccessful   attempt to  borrow sufficient money  to  purchase  part-interest 
in the   Star,   but  he   failed   to secure  the   loan and  turned   instead   to the 
study of   law in the evenings.     He   borrowed   law books   from   Henry Miller,  a 
young  lawyer, who guided his  choice  of readings,   and   in  1841   Holden  passed 
the   North Carolina bar examination with honors.     In  less   than a year   the 
young   lawyer  received  an appointment as   general   assignee  in bankruptcy in 
Wake  County.     During  the  year he held  this   position,   the  rising young attor- 
ney won a  local   reputation  at  the  bar  and achieved   some  prominence   in pub- 
lic   life.     "Perhaps,"  as one writer has  remarked,   "he could  have  had  a suc- 
cessful  career  in  law and  thus  attained at  far   lighter cost  to  himself his 
later  political   ambitions.'" 
Meanwhile Holden had married Miss Anne  Young  in   1841.     She  belonged 
to a prominent  North Carolina family,   and  the marriage  not only   improved 
^William W.   Holden,   Memoirs,  ed.  W.   K.   Boyd   (Durham:     The  Seeman 
Printery,   1911),   p.   95. 
^Samuel A. Ashe (ed.), Biographical History of North Carolina (Vol. 
VIII;   Greensboro:     Van Noppen,   1906),   p.   185. 
5Edgar E. Folk. "W. W. Holden, Political Journalist" (Unpublished 
Ph. D. dissertation, Dept. of English, George Peabody College for Teachers, 
1934),   p.   25. 
her husband's   social   status  considerably,   but  also provided  the  sort  of 
security which enabled him  to borrow the money  that was  so essential   to 
the achievement of  his soaring  ambition.     The marriage  proved a happy one, 
and  produced  three children --  a boy and  two girls. 
Not only was  Holden advancing professionally,   publicly,   and socially, 
but politically as  well.     In politics  he was  a Whig,   true to the  teaching 
of  "Father"  Heartt  and Thomas  Lemay.     In   1840 he made  his  first   political 
speeches,   and  two years   later he was  a delegate   to the Whig  state convention. 
The Whig Party was  at  the  time   in the ascendancy   in the   state,   and 
had  the  backing of  a number of excellent  newspapers.     The official  organ of 
the Democratic  Party,  The  North Carolina Standard in Raleigh,   was,  on the 
other  hand,   in the  hands   of an editor who  possessed   little  or no ability. 
Because a change  of editors was   imperative   if  they were ever to defeat  the 
Whigs,   the  party  leaders,   recognizing Holden's   literary abilities,   offered 
him the editorship of the   Standard.     Holden thereupon borrowed   $2000 to 
purchase  the   paper  and on June   1,   1843,   became   the owner and editor of the 
official  Democratic organ.     He  now gave  up all   idea of  practicing   law and 
dedicated himself  to a career as  a political editor. 
A satisfactory explanation of  Holden's  change   of parties  has  never 
been given.     His  critics   charge  that the  change   was made  purely   for per- 
sonal   gain,   and  that there  was  no real   change  of   political  opinions.     This 
insinuation has never  seemed wholly credible,   however,   for   the  Whig Party 
was   then dominant and Holden was one of   its most   promising adherents.     The 
Democrats,  on the other   hand,   had,  at  the  time,   little  power and  little 
prestige.     Holden was moreover  compelled   to hazard  borrowing   funds   to  pur- 
chase  a newspaper  that was   in every sense  a failure. 
A study of  Holden's  personality suggests   the more  plausible explana- 
tion that  he  was  by nature  out  of harmony with  the   increasingly aristocratic 
"**y. 
tendencies of  the  Whig Party in North Carolina.     If  he  had  not  been  influ- 
enced by a complete change  of  political opinions   as   some   authorities  have 
held,    he  had  at   least  begun to realize that his  principles  had more   in 
common with  those  of the  Democratic   Party.     Holden was also  beginning to 
be   influenced  by the  states'   rights  doctrines  of  John C.   Calhoun,   and   to 
feel   that  the Democratic  Party was  developing a stronger   position on this 
issue than were   the Whigs.     His   shift  in party allegiance was made,   it would 
seem,   because   it   "offered  a true challenge   to his   ingenuity,   a chance  to  set 
forth his   ideas   on  individual   liberties  and   state  rights."' 
From the  beginning   Holden set an example of   journalistic excellence, 
and   in time  he became the  best  known editor,   and  his paper  the most widely 
circulated   in the entire   state.     The  success   is not  surprising   for  he   brought 
to  his task great  abilities  and drive,   which his  training still   further en- 
hanced.     He  had   grown  from childhood  in the  offices  of  the  best newspapers 
in  North Carolina,   under  the most experienced  and capable editors   in the 
state. 
His newspaper techniques added much  to  the  advancement of  state 
journalism.     As  an editor,   he demonstrated  that  he was  utterly  fearless 
in campaigning for the  causes   that  he considered  right and,   in a  surprising 
majority of cases,   he had   the   support of   the  people.     Unlike most   leaders 
of  his   type,   Holden did  not appeal   solely  to the  prejudices  of  the   lower 
classes,   but  preferred  to  key  the   Standard   to reaching "the  people"  --   the 
6Boyd,   28. 
7Horace Wilson Raper,   "The  Political  Career of William W.   Holden 
with Special  Reference  to  His Provisional Governorship"     (Unpublished 
Masters*   Thesis,   Dept.   of  History,   University of  North Carolina,   1947), 
p.   9. 
Hereafter cited  as  Raper,   "Political   Career of   Holden" 
• 8 intelligentsia as well   as   the masses. 
Both as  an editor and as   a political   leader,   Holden worked   for the 
advancement  of  the common man and  did  a great deal   to undermine  the  aristo- 
cratic  control  of   the  state.     He   labored   for  an extension of   suffrage  to 
the masses,   for construction of  railroads   in all   sections  of   the  state,   for 
labor  reforms,   for a  state penitentiary system,   and  for   improvement  of pub- 
lic  schools.     On the other hand,   he  became  a confirmed  follower of John C. 
Calhoun,   and during this  period  championed   slavery and  states'   rights.     He 
supported   the  right  of  the  South to secede   peacefully,   although  in the   last 
years   before  the Civil War he cautioned against talcing such a step. 
Through his editorship of   the   Standard,   Holden not only helped to 
prepare  the  popular mind   for  the acceptance  of the  right  of  secession,   but 
he  also  built  the Democratic  Party  into the  dominant  party of  the   state. 
When he   became editor of   the   Standard,   he   found  that  the  Democratic  Party 
had deteriorated   to the   point  that   it was  out of touch with the  people.     It 
was  opposed   to all   internal   improvements   and,   it  seemed,   to  progress  in 
general.      Holden  put  new life   into  the  party and   in  1848  the  Democrats emerged 
in favor  of   internal   improvements. 
Holden realized   that   if   the Whigs  were  to be defeated,   a thoroughly 
popular   issue  had   to  be   found.     The   issue  he chose was   free  suffrage,  and 
in  1848  the Democrats  nearly  achieved  victory on the  strength of   this  appeal. 
After  this  Holden was  the  virtual   dictator  of the  Democratic  Party. 
His   influence could  "kill  and make  alive"  politically.     He was  the drill- 
master of   the party whipping straying members  back  into  line  or dismissing 
8Horace Wilson Raper,   "William W.   Holden:     A Political   Biography" 
(unpublished  Ph.   D.   dissertation,   Dept.  of  History,  University of   North 
Carolina,   1951),   p.   410. 
Hereafter cited  as  Raper,   "W.  W.   Holden." 
them, and building a powerful efficient organization.9  In 1850 he succeeded 
in electing David Reid governor, and the Whigs never again controlled the 
state. After Reid had served two terms as governor, Holden was successful 
in placing Thomas Bragg in that office in 1854 and 1856. 
The year 1858 was a turning point in Holden's career.  Having made 
governors of less capable men, he felt that he could secure the chief exe- 
cutiveship for himself because of his popular appeal to the public.  He 
had an intense ambition to be governor, perhaps not so much for himself as 
for his family.  He felt that his illegitimacy and lack of aristocratic 
background deprived his family of ready acceptance by the socially promi- 
nent.  As members of the governor's family, he reasoned, they would be 
accepted. 
The Democratic Convention, however, refused to give Holden the 
nomination.  The slaveholding aristocracy which was beginning to gain con- 
trol of the party blocked his nomination, in part, presumably, because of 
his family background.  In any case Holden blamed his defeat upon his lack 
of social acceptability.  In addition, however, his brusque manner in deal- 
ing with his antagonists created a fear within the opposition that he wished 
to build an absolutist state for his own political ends. 
This defeat did not quench Holden's political ambitions.  A few 
months later he ran for the United States Senate, but the General Assembly 
refused to appoint him, and these two rejections marked the beginning of 
his quarrel with the Democratic aristocracy, which led eventually to his 
complete break with the party he had espoused a decade and a half earlier. 
By 1860 Holden had shifted from his militant stand on secession to a position 
of loyalty to the Union.  This repudiation of the aristocratic slaveholders 
9Folk, "Holden, Political Journalist," 48. 
10Raper, "W. W. Holden," 41. 
involved  more   than his  quarrel with  them.     Actually he  had always   been com- 
mitted  to  the  advancement of  the  common man and   had  therefore   never  been 
truly  in  rapport with the  slaveholding class.     Holden also prided  himself 
on editing the only newspaper  in the  state  that  actually expressed   the 
ideas and wishes  of the   people;   and,   being  a political   opportunist,   he  did 
not  want  to advance  a cause  which the  people  would not   follow.     In  1860 he 
was  persuaded  that the  people were oppossed   to   secession,   and  such was   the 
position   that  his  paper  advanced.     His  position  on secession was   now so 
stoutly  opposed   to that  of   the  slaveholding Democratic   leaders   that  they 
punished  him first  by depriving him of his  office as   State  Printer,   and 
then by   founding another Democratic  paper   in Raleigh which would  reflect 
the  opinions of  the  party   leadership. 
In 1860 Holden supported  the  Southern Democratic   ticket,   though he 
personally favored  Stephen A.   Douglas,   the   leading Northern Democrat.     He 
continued  to hold  his   pro-Union views,   but,   after the   bombardment of  Fort 
Sumter,   acquiesced  in his  state's  secession,   forced  as   he was  by   Southern 
opinion  to join the movement  or  become  a martyr. 
William  Holden was  one  of the delegates  who  signed  the   North Caro- 
lina  secession ordinance,   but   it came  too  late   to win him reinstatement   into 
the  Democratic   Party.     In  1861   he  therefore  assumed  the   lead   in organizing 
the discontented elements  of  the   state  into the  Conservative   Party and   his 
amazing   leadership abilities   led the  new party  from obscurity to state dom- 
ination within a year.     He more  than anyone  else,  brought about  the election 
of  Zebulon Vance,  destined to  be  remembered  as   one  of  the Confederacy's 
greatest war  governors. 
11Horace Wilson Raper,   "William W.  Holden and   the  Peace  Movement   in 
North  Carolina,"     North Carolina  Historical   Review,   XXXI   (October,   1954), 
494. 
During   the Civil War  Holden was  the  acknowledged   leader of  his 
state's  peace movement,   which began  in  1863.     Convinced   of  the  futility 
of  the war,   he   felt   that   it would be   far  better   to make  an  honorable   peace 
while   it was  possible,   than to  be   forced   later   to accept  unconditional 
surrender.     Holden was  condemned  by  the Confederates  and   troops wrecked 
the  Standard's   presses,   but  the   notoriety created  by this  episode only 
publicized  his   peace   activities. 
Holden as  "party boss"  expected   the  Vance  administration to adopt 
the   peace movement.     In time,   however, Governor  Vance  shifted   from the 
position of a partial   supporter of  the  peace movement   to  that  of a positive 
opponent.     Early   in  1864 Vance   decided  that  to  stay   in  office   he must follow 
a policy of  vigorous   support of  the War,   and  break with   Holden.     The   rupture 
came   not as  a  result of conflicting opinions,   but  because  of an  irrepressible 
conflict between two politicians.     Holden had  failed   to   realize  that Vance 
12 would  and  could  not  be  controlled  by anyone. 
Vance's  "treachery"  could   not  be   tolerated by  Holden,   and he   set  out 
to defeat  the  Governor   in  1864.     Holden depended  upon the   popular momentum 
of  the  peace movement  to elect  him,   but  his   strength with the   people was 
not  nearly so effective  as   it  first appeared   to   be.     lfe  was  now for   the   se- 
cond   time denied the office  of   governor,   and  he   accepted  his defeat  without 
undue  bitterness.     His   peace efforts did not  stop,   however,   until   the move- 
ment was  finally suppressed  by   force,   and  until   the very close of the war, 
there  remained  a discontented  element   in  the  state. 
It was  no surprise   that when  the war was   over,   Holden was  appointed 
by  President Andrew Johnson as   Provisional   Governor of   North Carolina.     He 
turned  the editorship of  the  Standard over  to  his  son,   Joseph,   and   assumed 
12Raper,   "Political   Career of   Holden,"     36. 
10 
office  in June,   1865,   confronting an enormously difficult task,   for  the 
state  government was utterly disorganized,  without   funds,   and  with no means 
of collecting  taxes. 
The Provisional   Governor assumed   that all   state and   local  offices 
were  automatically vacated  with the  fall  of  the Vance Administration,  and 
that   to Unionize the  state  he  should appoint only those who were   in complete 
sympathy with the  federal   government.     In  less  than thirty days,   Holden 
appointed some   four  thousand   state  and   local  officials,   including,   perhaps 
understandably,   a number   of   bad  choices.     The most criticized   aspect of   the 
provisional   governorship was   Holden's  granting of  pardons.     The northern 
press charged  that  the governor was   too   liberal  with his  pardon recommenda- 
tions.     There was   some  truth  in this accusation for of the  twelve hundred 
requests   for  pardons,   Holden recommended   that  only  four be  rejected.     The 
financial  problem was   solved when Holden   induced  President Johnson  to turn 
over to the state  the  remains  of   its war   property,   valued at   $150,000.     This 
was done   for no other  state.     When the   provisional  governorship ended,   the 
state  treasury showed  a surplus  of   $40,000. 
Holden's  primary  task was   to prepare   the  state for readmission  into 
the Union.     He,  therefore,   called  a state  convention to meet  in Raleigh on 
October  2,   1865.     The  convention repealed  the Ordinance of   Secession,   pro- 
hibited  slavery  in the  state,  and  provided  that a governor's election be 
held on November   9.     Holden wished  above  all   things  to be  the  duly elected 
governor  of  North Carolina upon completion of  his term as   provisional  gov- 
ernor.     His opponent,  Jonathan Worth,   defeated him,  however,   by almost  six 
thousand votes,  despite  the   fact that  Holden had carefully  planned,   through 
the patronage   power,   to build an effective  political   organization.     He  had 
been denied his  greatest  ambition for   the   third time,   but,   as   one careful 
II 
student of   the episode  has  said,   "North Carolina was  the   loser.     He had 
proven he was  a capable   leader." 
Holden did not expect  his  term of office  to  terminate quickly.     He 
felt   it would  continue until  Congress   gave   formal  recognition to  the new 
state   government,   but he was  directed by the  President  to  turn the office 
over  to Worth,   and  on December  28,   1965,  the   provisional   governorship was 
terminated. 
Holden now resumed the  editorship of  the   Standard,  and   set out to 
wrest control   from  the Conservative  Party and return it   to the  Johnson 
supporters.     It was  to accomplish this  goal,   that   he took the   lead   in 
organizing a Republican Party   in the   state.     During the   fall  of   1866   Holden 
and others   began to weld   the discontented elements  in the  state   into a 
party unit.     Perhaps  the most  notable  feature of this  campaign to organize 
the Republican Party  in every county was  the   introduction of the  Union 
League as  a party weapon to control   the  Negro vote.   Holden became head  of 
the  League   in North Carolina,   and his  paper  became   its  official  organ.     It 
should  be  added,  however,   that while   Holden felt  compelled to  protect  the 
Negro,   he never recognized him as  an equal   of the white.     He was  forced  to 
accept   political   equality  for  the Negro,   but  he  never accepted   social   equality. 
North Carolina felt  the wrath of radical   reconstruction during the 
administration of Governor Worth.     Holden  supported the  congressional  rad- 
icals  and broke with President Johnson for  vetoing the   Reconstruction Act 
of   1867,  which placed  North Carolina  like the other states of   the   late 
Confederacy,   under a federal  military commander,   and  required   that  the 
state draw up a new constitution and  adopt  the  Fourteenth Amendment  before 
it could  be  readmitted  to the   Union. 
13Raper,   "W.  W.   Holden,"   173. 
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The Constitutional   Convention which met on January  14,   1868,  was dominated 
by Republicans  —   107   to   13.     Among other things,   the  new constitution 
changed  the  governor's   term of  office   from two  to four years.     Had  this 
change  not been made,   Holden would not  have  been impeached   in  1870  for he 
would  have  been defeated  at  the   polls   four months earlier. 
The election of   1868 was  an extremely  bitter one.     "It was   in part 
a battle   between the Union League and  the Ku  Klux  Klan."1^    The  Republican, 
or Radical,   nominee was   Holden;   the  Conservative,  or  Democratic,   candidate 
was  Thomas   S.  Ashe.     The  election was   the first   in which the Negroes voted 
for governor,   and   their vote determined the outcome.     Holden received  the 
Negro vote,   as well   as  the white  Republican vote,   and  the   party which had 
been formed only a year  before  under his   leadership,   now took control  of 
the  state.     Holden had at   last  achieved his  greatest ambition.     His  success, 
however,  was   to  be  short   lived. 
He sold   the  Standard,   relinquished all  connections with  it,   and 
promptly began negotiations  for  the  removal   of Governor Worth.     After a 
protest,   Worth was  deposed,  and Holden was  again appointed Provisional 
Governor until   the beginning of  his elected  term.     He took  the  oath of 
office  on July  2,   1868. 
The  first  task of  the  Holden administration was   to secure  the re- 
admission of  North Carolina into the   Union.     Holden was  successful   in in- 
ducing the  state  to meet   the  Congressional   requirements,   and on July  11, 
President Johnson announced by  proclamation  that  North Carolina was  restored 
to the  Federal   Union.     Radical   Reconstruction and military rule came  to an 
end,   and  Holden was  on his own. 
1^Folk,   "Holden,   Political  Journalist,"    61, 
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His efforts,   as  governor,   in the  fields of public   education,   inter- 
nal   improvements,   and   industry  (especially  in raising the   position of   labor) 
were  of  great  service  and   lasting benefit.     Forced  to work with Carpetbag 
and  Negro elements  of his  party,   however,   he  committed excesses   that he 
might otherwise   have  avoided.     This was especially  true   in  the matter of 
racial equality,   and   in the end   it  led  to his  being removed   from office. 
The opposition to Governor  Holden was   begun by Governor Worth on 
the  day  Holden took office,   and  did  not cease  until  he was   finally impeached. 
The attack upon the  Holden administration was   led  by  the official  organ of 
the Conservative Party,   The  Raleigh  Sentinel,  edited   by Josiah Turner,   Jr. 
Two especially damaging charges  were  the  reconstruction frauds  perpetrated 
by the  state   legislature,   and  the  "war" with the  Ku  Klux  Klan which   led 
directly  to  Holden's   impeachment. 
Governor  Holden was   accused  by the Conservatives   of being  impli- 
cated   in the  reconstruction fiscal   irregularities  that occurred  during  his 
administration.     The most   important of  these   involved  an   issuance  by  the 
General Assembly of more  than six-million dollars   in worthless  railroad 
bonds.     Had they been executed,   it would  have   bankrupted   the  state.     It 
has  never  been proved,   however,   that Holden was  connected   with this or any 
other   fraud  in any way,   or  that  he  profited  from them.     Instead,   it  is 
generally conceded  that North Carolina suffered  as   little  as any  southern 
state  under reconstruction and  that Holden's  administration was   among  the 
best of the reconstruction governments.16     Nevertheless   there was  a move 
during Holden's   impeachment  proceedings,   to charge him with being involved 
in the railroad  frauds. 
15Raper,  "W.   W.  Holden;'     411-412. 
16Raper, "Political Career of Holden,"  155. 
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CHAPTER   II 
THE  "WAR"  WITH  THE  KU  KLUX   KLAN 
The  "war" with the   Ku  Klux  Klan,   which   led  directly  to  the   im- 
peachment of Governor  Holden,   resulted   from the  attempts   of  the Republi- 
can Party   to  break with the  tradition of  white   supremacy.     The Republicans 
owed   their victory of   1868  to  the  Negro vote,   and  because  their  future  suc- 
cesses  depended  upon the   continued   support of   this   group  the   Holden admin- 
istration made   "radical"  attempts   to guarantee   political   and civil   equality 
to members  of  the colored  race.     To  prevent  this  radical   plan  for Negro 
equality,   the   Ku  Klux  Klan was  formed   in the   state,   and,   by   intimidation 
and   other  illegal   action,   it  succeeded  in returning  North Carolina to white 
supremacy. 
The  Klan was  organized  in North Carolina   in  the  same   year  that 
Holden was  elected governor.     It consisted of   three  separate  organizations: 
the   Constitutional  Union Guard,   the White   Brotherhood,   and  the   Invisible 
Empire.     Holden  had been   in office only  three months when trouble  began   to 
occur throughout   the  state.     During the   fall   of   1868 the  Klan concentrated 
its   actions   in  the counties of Alamance,   Caswell,  Orange,  Jones,   Lenoir, 
and  Chatham,   but  there were threats  of violence  and  outlawry  all   over   North 
Carolina.     While  no accurate   figures  are  available   as  to  the  number of   Klan 
depredations upon their hapless victims,   they  are   known  to  be  high.     The 
offenses  ranged   from mere  threats  or  beatings   to actual  murder. 
With the  first outbreak of violence,   Holden accepted  the   responsi- 
bility of  restoring peace  and  order   to the  state,   and  "spared  no means   and 
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no   labor  for  the  space of  two  years."1     The Governor attempted  at   first  to 
put an end   to the   Ku Klux outrages   by using normal  constitutional   methods, 
but   this only  stirred  them to  greater activity,   and Holden   finally  felt 
impelled   by necessity to use military force. 
The Governor's  first peaceful  action against  the Klan was  taken in 
October,   1868 when he   issued  the  first of   five  similar   proclamations  to 
deter  the organization's   activities.    When it became evident  that   these 
executive   pronouncements   served  only  to   incite  his masked enemies   to greater 
daring,   the Governor  turned to   legislative action to find corrective mea- 
sures.     Having an obedient   legislature  at his  command  --   thirty-eight Repub- 
licans   out  of  fifty  Senators  and eighty out of one hundred  and   twenty mem- 
bers  of  the   House  of Representatives  --  he  secured   in April,   1869,   authority 
to use  detectives   to search out  Klansmen.     Such action proved unsuccessful, 
and,   like  his  proclamations,   only   increased  Klan activities. 
By  the  end of  1869,   Holden was   beginning to feel   that he must use 
force   and,   possibly, martial   law.     Under existing statutes,   a governor 
could  not  send  state militia  into a county unless  the magistrates  requested 
it,  and  to  Holden's  discomfiture,   the counties   needing the  militia were 
2 
either controlled  by  the  Klan  or by Klan  sympathizers.       It was   also  im- 
possible  to obtain white militia as promptly as   needed,   and the  use of 
Negro militia aroused  bitter opposition.     To forestall  any question as   to 
the   legality of  the Governor's  declaration of martial   law,   Holden sent  a 
message   to  the General   Assembly on December   19,   1869,   requesting  that  power 
be  granted him  to suppress   the violence  existing in the  state.     In response 
Holden,   Memoirs,   125. 
2Raper,   "W.  W.   Holden,"  358. 
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to this  request,   the   legislature   passed  the  famous   Shoffner Act which gave 
Itolden broad executive  prerogative   in declaring martial   law.     (See  page   38) 
With the  passage   of   the   Shoffner Act,   Holden was empowered  to strike 
against  the  Klan,  but  he  was  unwilling  to resort   to such a move   immediately. 
Instead,   he  announced   in February,   1870,   that   if  a number  of  prominent cit- 
izens   in a county would  recommend  someone of  influence   to  canvass  that  county 
to persuade   the  Klan to  disband,   he would  appoint  that  person a representa- 
tive  of the   law.     Four  counties   at this  time   --   Orange,  Chatham, Alamance, 
and  Caswell   --  were   in need  of  such a measure.     The  plan worked  successfully 
in both Orange  and Chatham,   but   it failed   in Alamance  and Caswell,   where   the 
Klan was much   larger than  in Orange  and Chatham,   and where   its   activities 
were more  extensive.     In  fact,   the civil   officers  there were  known to  be 
Klan members,   and no one  volunteered   for   the   job. 
All   peaceful methods of  restoring   law and order  to Alamance  and  Cas- 
well   counties   had been exhausted.    Holden had   issued   four proclamations  with- 
in a year  and  a half.     He  had written to members  of Congress,   to President 
Grant,   and   to military  officers  asking for  aid   in finding a solution  to   the 
vexing problem,-* and   it  now appeared  that military force was  the only  re- 
course   left to the executive   if   political   rights were  to  be maintained   for 
the  Negroes,  and  if  the  Republicans   hoped  to  remain   in office.     State elec- 
tions were   to  be  held   in August,   1870,   and unless  some  drastic  action were 
taken  immediately,   the  Ku Klux Klan would  be  successful   in  its   intimidation 
policy.     The  Negroes would   be  too frightened  to exercise   their newly won voting 
privileges;   thus  the   future  of  the  Republican  Party would be   in serious   trouble.4 
3Folk,   "Holden,   Political Journalist,"     68-69. 
^Raper,   "Political   Career of  Holden,"     165. 
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On March  10,   1870,  Governor  Holden declared Alamance  County   in a 
state of   insurrection on the grounds  that  the  county  officials  were  unable 
to safeguard  the  persons and property of that county.     The civil  authorities 
were  not   immediatley replaced  by military authorities   because,   as Holden 
wrote  President Grant,   he  could   not  "rely upon the militia  to  repress   these 
outrages,   .   .   .   for   in the   localities   in which  these   outrages   occur,   white 
militia of  the  proper character cannot   be obtained,   and   it would but  aggra- 
vate   the evil   to employ colored militia."       At the  same  time,  Holden re- 
quested  and received   federal   troops  to aid   in the  suppression of  the   in- 
surrection.     He also made  an unsuccessful  request  to the  states'   congress- 
men  that  the writ of  habeas  corpus  be   suspended   in counties declared   in a 
state of   insurrection. 
No  action was   taken until  June  8,  when Holden  met with John Pool  and 
eleven other  prominent Republicans  to discuss  the  problem.     The  suggestion 
to employ military force   against  the   Klan was made   by John Pool,   and  the 
entire   group agreed  that   it was  the only remaining  recourse.     It was  de- 
cided  that  two regiments   of militia  should  be organized  on a  volunteer 
basis.     Colonel  William Clark was chosen to command   the   first  regiment 
with headquarters   in Raleigh;   and George W.   Kirk,   a  native of  Tennessee, 
was chosen to command  the  second.     Kirk had   led a band  of Union guerrillas 
during the Civil War, which made numerous   raids upon western  North Caro- 
lina.     He  had  a reputation among former Confederates   as  a desperado and 
bush-whacker.     Holden probably chose  him on the assumption that his  terror- 
istic  reputation would be  an advantage   in putting down the Klan, with   less 
bloodshed,   since  he  was   so much feared.6     Kirk  left Raleigh   immediately for 
5Ibid.,   164. 
6Folk, "Holden, Political Journalist,"  70. 
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Asheville,   where  he organized  his   force,   and by July   15,   they were officially 
mustered   into the service  of  the  state.     Ite chose George   B.   Burgen,  also a 
Tennessean,  as   second   in command. 
In the meanwhile,  Holden had declared Caswell  County in a state of 
insurrection as  of July 8.     Before  allowing Kirk to take  any action,   the 
Governor went  to Washington to make certain he   had  the  President's support. 
President Grant,   Holden said,   sustained  him in his action.7 
The Conservatives,   needing an   issue which could  be  used  to overthrow 
the Holden administration,   had  provoked  the Governor   to use  military  force. 
They  now condemned  the executive as  a tyrant and  pilloried his   administra- 
tion without  stint.     It was  charged   that  the Governor   intended  to use  troops 
to control   the  August elections,   and   that he hoped  to  provoke  a violent con- 
flict  between the  people  and the military so  that  he could  proclaim the 
entire   state   in   insurrection;   and  thus   set up a Republican military dicta- 
torship.       Had  these charges  been true,   the Governor would  not  have   limited 
the activities  of Kirk  to  such a small   area. 
The  "war" with the  Ku Klux  --  commonly called   the Kirk-Holden War9— 
began on July  15 when both Alamance and  Caswell  counties  were  occupied  by 
Kirk's militia.     Kirk began at  once  to arrest men whom he  had  reason to 
believe were   leaders  of  the  Klan.     Eighty-two were  arrested  in Alamance 
County and  nineteen  in Caswell.     The normal   constitutional   rights of   the 
men who were  seized  were denied  on  the  grounds   that  the   two counties  were 
7Holden,  Memoirs ,   M4. 
8The Raleigh Sentinel,  July   7,   1870. 
9The "Kirk-Holden War" was the name given the clash by Holden's poli- 
tical enemies, and is misleading. The episode was not a war declared by the 
executive upon the citizens of the state, but rather a police action to con- 
trol   the   Klan. 
19 
under martial   law.     There was   no warrant   for  their arrest,   no reason was 
given for their detention,   and  no provision was made  for their  trial.     Through 
counsel   the  prisoners appealed  to Chief Justice Richmond  M.   Pearson for 
writs  of  habeas  corpus.     The writs were   granted,   and  Kirk was  ordered  to 
appear  before  the   Chief Justice   in Raleigh at  once with the prisoners,   and 
to  show cause   for  their arrest  and  detention.     When the writ was   served  upon 
Kirk,   he  refused  to obey  it,   but   instead  transported his  prisoners   to Yancey- 
ville,   where  he used  the Caswell  County Courthouse as his official   head- 
quarters  and  jail.     The counsel   for the  defendants next  sought a writ of 
attachment against  Kirk,  but  before Pearson acted,  he consulted with the 
Governor.     Holden  then put   into writing  the  reasons for Kirk's  refusal   to 
obey the writ,  and declared  that  the  prisoners  would  be brought before 
Pearson as   soon as   the circumstances  allowed   it. 
The Chief Justice refused  to issue the writ of attachment,   but on 
July   26  he handed  down a second  order demanding  that Kirk's   prisoners  be 
brought before him.     Kirk and Holden again refused,  and  an attempt was 
immediately made  to get writs  of   attachment   issued against  both Kirk and 
the Governor.     The  Chief Justice  rejected  this  request,  maintaining that 
the  judicial   remedies  had been exhausted.     Pearson's  position seemed to 
have  been that the  right of habeas  corpus  had   not been suspended,   but   the 
court was  unable   to enforce   its  decisions.     The   impotency of  the court  de- 
rived   from the   fact  that a posse comitatus   to execute a writ  in either 
Alamance  or Caswell  county would  have  to be  composed  of citizens  of that 
county,  which was   impossible  under the   present   status.     If  the court attemp- 
ted to enforce   its  order,  civil  war might occur.10    The writ was,   therefore, 
for all  practical   purposes  suspended. 
10Cortez A.   M.   Ewing "Two Reconstruction Impeachments,"     North Caro- 
lina Historical  Review,  XV  (July,   1938),   209. 
The  state elections  were   to be  held  on August 3,  and  Holden made 
plans   for policing any  section of   the  state where  the  Ku  Klux Klan might 
cause   trouble.     Kirk was  ordered   to send  troops   to Asheville and   Shelby; 
Colonel   Clark sent  troops   to Hillsboro,  Chapel   Hill,   and Carthage.     The 
Governor's  purpose was   to assure   a fair  and  free election,   but  the Conser- 
vatives  pointed  to  this move  as  proof  that the Governor   intended  to con- 
trol   the elections.     This  was true  only   in the  sense   that  he was  attempting 
to guarantee  to a minority  group  the  right to vote.     In reality,   it was   the 
Klansmen and  not  the Republicans,   who were  attempting  to control   the elections. 
In spite  of  Holden's   actions,   or  perhaps because of   them,   the Repub- 
lican Party  suffered  a  landslide  defeat.     Six Conservatives were elected  to 
Congress,   and  the General  Assembly went Conservative  by more than a two- 
thirds majority.     This election marked the  turning point   of Holden's Gover- 
norship and  of his   political  career.     He was  never again  to experience  poli- 
tical   success   in any  form.     It would  have  been better for  him had he  been 
up  for  re-election for he would  surely have  been defeated   --  a much less 
disgraceful way  to  leave office   than  impeachment. 
The  climax to  the  "war" with the   Ku Klux  Klan came   the day after the 
elections,  with the  arrest  of Josiah Turner.     Turner had   been violently 
critical  of  the Holden administration  in the Sentinel,   and had   publicly 
dared  the Governor to arrest him.     On August  3,   he  published a  threatening 
letter to Holden,   and on the  following day he was  arrested  before the  re- 
sults of the  election were   known.     George  Burgen,   Kirk's   assistant,   made 
the arrest without  a warrant,   in Orange County,  which was  not under martial 
law.     Turner had,   in fact,   provoked his arrest  and he was  pleased when  it 
happened,   for   it gave the  Conservatives an additional   issue to use against 
Holden  in demanding his   impeachment. 
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Having gained  control   of   the  state  legislature,   the Conservatives 
were  now determined   to break   the military rule.     The  counsel   for   Kirk's 
prisoners,   having  failed  to get  results   from the  state   judiciary,   appealed 
to Judge George W.   Brooks,  of  the United   States  District Court  in  Salisbury. 
Brooks   heard   their plea and decided  that  the  Fourteenth Amendment due  pro- 
cess  clause   gave  him   jurisdiction   in the case.     His  jurisdiction was ques- 
tionable   for  even today United  States   courts  would hesitate to interfere 
with  the  states   in criminal   law enforcement.     Nevertheless,  Judge  Brooks 
issued writs   of habeas  corpus   on August  6 ordering Kirk to  produce  the 
prisoners   before  him by August   18. 
Holden had  not expected  the federal  government   to   interfere with 
his  plans.     On the   following day he  telegraphed  President Grant   that he 
did  not plan to obey the  federal   order unless   federal   troops were  sent   to 
enforce   it,   and  the President,   thereupon turned  the matter over to his 
Attorney General  who advised  the Governor to yield  to  the  federal   court. 
This   forced  upon Holden a complete change   in strategy.     He dared   not resist 
the   federal   government;   yet  he could  not depend upon what  Judge   Brooks  would 
do.      Holden decided   it would  be best  to obey Chief Justice Pearson's original 
writs  of  habeas  corpus. 
The  Chief  Justice opened court on August   18,   but   the  prisoners,   through 
counsel,  withdrew their original   application on  the  basis that Judge  Brooks 
had already   issued  his writ returnable on the  same day.     The federal   judge 
on August   18,   released  the  prisoners  on the motion of  the defense  counsel 
without  hearing a word  of  testimony or  investigating the matter   in any way. 
In response   to this   action,   the  Standard charged  that  "he  turns   loose  upon 
the   state  a body of men charged with crimes which would  put to blush the 
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darkest page  of criminal   history." 
Motions were  then made  to attach Kirk and  his assistant,  George 
Burgen.     Both were  arrested during the  fall   and given a  trial,   but were 
acquitted  and released  on November   24.     Turner  tried  to draw up a bench 
warrant against   Holden,   but   it was   turned down by  the State  Supreme Court, 
lie was able,   however,   to get   the  grand   jury of Orange County  to draw up 
a true  bill   against the Governor for assault and  battery   in a suit for 
three thousand  dollars.     The  sheriff of Wake  County refused  to  serve  the 
warrant and  the  case was  dropped. 
On August   25,   Holden's  opposition secured   from Judge  Anderson Mit- 
chell   --   North Carolina  Superior Court  Justice  for the  tenth district  -- 
an injunction against David A.  Jenkins,   State  Treasurer,  and A.   D.   Jenkins, 
Paymaster,   forbidding them to  pay the  state  troops.     Holden evaded   the   in- 
junction by removing Jenkins  as Paymaster.     He then appointed   John B.   Neathery 
to the post.     Neathery withdrew from the  state  treasury  sufficient  funds   to 
pay the  troops,   and began making payments. 
Holden ordered the  troops mustered out of   service on September   21, 
and on November   10 he  declared the state of   insurrection  in Alamance  and 
Caswell  at an end.     The Governor's efforts   to suppress   the   Ku  Klux Klan 
had ended   in failure,   and this failure,   brought with it  his  destruction 
as well   as  the downfall  of  the Republican Party   in North Carolina. 
11 The North Carolina  Standard,  August   20,   1870. 
CHAPTER  III 
IMPEACHMENT  AND  TRIAL 
The Republican defeat   in the elections of August,   1870,   had  come 
as   a surprise  to Republicans  and Conservatives  alike.     Few believed   that 
the  Conservatives  would win;   certainly none had expected  such an over- 
whelming victory.     Having gained  the upper  hand,   however,   the  Conserva- 
tives  determined   to  put an  immediate end  to the Radical   Republican rule 
of   Holden.     This determination plus   the failure of President Grant   to 
support   Holden's  use  of military force had  brought to a rapid end  the 
"war" with the Ku   Klux Klan. 
As  soon as   the  results  of  the  election were   known,   the  Conser- 
vative   press   began to demand  the   impeachment of Governor   Holden. 
t 
He   is    tsaid   one   journal]    the vilest man that ever polluted   a pub- 
lic office  and  his  crimes  are  now crying  in  trumpet  tones against him. 
Impeach  the   traitor,   the  apostate,   and the  renegade,   and drive  him   into 
the   infamous   oblivion which is  so   justly his due.1 
This demand was  continued   throughout  the  fall  of  1870;  many of Holden's 
friends   turned  away   from  him,   and  he was   left with only   the carpetbag 
element of   the Republican Party to support  him.    A Greensboro paper ar- 
gued   that: 
He  deserves   impeachment at   the hands of the  representatives  of 
the  people.     The   people  demand   it,   their  outraged   honor demands   it,   and 
1The  Tarboro Southerner,  August   11,   1870. 
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their representatives  must execute  their will,   not  as  partizans  representing 
a  political   party prosecuting a political   leader,   but as  representatives of 
the  people who ask that  justice may be done.   .    .   .2 
The General Assembly met on November   21,   and  the Conservative- 
controlled   legislature   began at once to undo a great  part  of the   Repub- 
lican Reconstruction program.     On the  second day of  the session a memor- 
ial of Adolphus  G. Moore,   one of  the men arrested  by Kirk,   was  presented 
to the House of Representatives,   demanding the   impeachment   of both Gover- 
nor Holden and  Chief Justice Pearson.       The  Conservatives  did not act at 
once   for   they were not certain they could command  the   two-thirds  vote re- 
quired   to remove   the Governor  from office.     They began,   instead,   by removing 
six Republicans   from  their seats   in the   House  and   Senate  and  replacing them 
with Conservatives,   (See page   33)  so that there was  no doubt  that  the oppo- 
sition could  secure  a  two-thirds majority against the Governor. 
Governor  Holden was well  aware  of what was  happening and  he  attempted 
to stop his   impeachment by trying to  reconcile  his  differences  with his 
opponents.     In his annual message to the General   Assembly,   he  presented 
a  reasoned  defense  for his military activities  against the  Klan,  and 
announced   that  he  favored   the  removal   of ex-Governor Vance's disabilities. 
It  is  to Holden's credit,   however,   that  he made no concessions   to the  Klan. 
He  presented  a defense,   but not an apology.     In fact he denounced the 
depredations of  the  Ku Klux Klan with the  same vigor  that he had employed 
when the  possibility of   impeachment had not  been hanging over him. 
r 
2The Greensboro Patriot,   November  24,   1870. 
3The Conservative  move  to  impeach  the Chief Justice was  based upon 
his   failure   to  force  Holden and Kirk  to obey  the writs of  habeas corpus. 
It was  charged   that  he was   in sympathy with the Governor's  plan to set up 
a military dictatorship over  the  state.     Actually Pearson's actions,   like 
Holden"s,  were  not   in accord with those of  the Conservatives,   and they 
wished  to  replace him with a Chief Justice who would express their views. 
Chief Justice   Pearson also sought  to clear  himself by  forwarding 
a memorial   to   the  Senate,   but  the Conservatives refused   to hear   it.     Des- 
pite   the efforts  of Josiah Turner,  who   led the movement to impeach the 
Chief Justice,   the  General  Assembly  soon dropped  the  charges   against  the 
jurist. 
A Conservative   Party caucus   decided   to   press for  impeachment of 
llolden   immediately,   but there were  prominent members within  the   party 
who were   opposed  to the move.     The most  prominent  person  to oppose  the 
move was  ex-Governor  Vance.       While  opposed   to the move,   Vance did  not 
take  a public   stand  against   it,   but   rather followed  a neutral   course.   He 
told a New  York   Herald   reporter: 
I   have  had   little or nothing  to say about  the   impeachment of  Governor   Hol- 
den.     1  have  advised  neither way  in regard  to  it,  my  ideas   in regard  to 
its   justice  and  policy being somewhat  in conflict.     Were  I  to  interfere 
in it either way   it would  be  charged upon me   ...   as  an act of  personal 
revenge   toward  a personal enemy,   or  as  done   to effect my  admission to the 
Senate.5 
Despite  the   opposition,   the  Conservatives   impeached the Governor 
in  less  than three  weeks  after the   legislature met.     The General  Assembly 
believed   itself  to be making   history  by   impeaching the   first American 
governor.     Actually Governor Charles Robinson of   Kansas,  who  had been 
impeached   in   1862,   had   been the  first.     His   trial,   however,   had ended 
in an almost unanimous  rejection of  the  charges,   while  Holden's   impeach- 
ment was   the   first  to result   in conviction  and actual   impeachment  and re- 
moval   of  a Governor   from office.     He was  also the   first  of  six Reconstruction 
4Raper,   "W.   W.   Holden,"  390. 
5Reprinted   in The Wilmington Journal,   January 6,   1871. 
Vance had  been appointed   to the  United  States  Senate,   but  had been 
refused  his   seat until   his disabilities were  removed. 
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governors   to be   legally   impeached.     Against  the other  five,   however,   the 
charges were not  sustained,  even  though two of  them gave  up their office.6 
On December 9, F. M. Strudwick, a Klan leader who had been a mem- 
ber of the murder party that planned to hang Senator Shoffner,7 intro- 
duced   into the   House of Representatives  the  following resolution: 
Resolved   that William W.   Holden,   Governor  of  North Carolina,  be   impeached 
of  high crimes  and misdemeanors   in off ice.^ 
t 
The  resolution was  adopted  and referred  to the   judiciary committee.     After 
five days  of discussion,   the  committee recommended   that   impeachment pro- 
ceedings   begin at once;   that a committee  of  seven be appointed  to prepare 
the  articles  of   impeachment;   and   that  the   Senate be  informed of  the  pro- 
ceedings . 
Three members of   the  House appeared   before the   Senate and  informed 
that body of  the   impeachment.     The  notification message   stated   in  part: 
Permit us,  Mr.   President  and  Senators,   to adopt  almost the very 
language  used  by him under circumstances  somewhat similar,   and  to  ask: 
"What is   it we want  here  to a great  act  of national   justice?"     "Do you 
want a criminal?"     "Where  was  there  so much  iniquity ever   laid  to  the 
charge of  any one?"     Senators,   "is   it a prosecutor you want?"     "You 
have  before you the  representatives  of   the  people of   North Carolina!" 
"Do you want a  tribunal?"    Where will   you  find  one superior to this? 
Therefore   it   is   that,   ordered by  the  representatives of  the   people of 
this commonwealth,   we   impeach William W.   Holden,  Governor  of  the  State 
of   North Carolina,   "of   high crimes and misdemeanors   in office." 
We "impeach him  in the  name  of  the  Representatives  of  North Caro- 
lina,  whose national   character he has  dishonored." 
We  "impeach him in the  name  of all   the   people  of  North Carolina, 
whose   laws,   rights and   liberties  he  has  subverted." 
6Ewing,   204. 
7Trial   of William W.   Holden  Before   the   Senate  of  North Carolina 
on  Impeachment ,~Vol.   II   (Raleigh:     Sentinel   Printing Office,   1871)  p.592. 
Hereafter cited as   Holden,   Impeachment Proceedings. 
8Holden,   Impeachment Proceedings,   I,   1. 
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We  "impeach him in the   name  and  by virtue  of those eternal   laws 
of   justice which  he has  violated." 
We   impeach him  in the  name   of human nature   itself,  which he has 
so cruelly outraged,   injured  and oppressed;   and   in the name  of the Rep- 
resentatives  of   the  people do demand   that  the   Senate  organize  a high court 
of   impeachment,   and take order  that William W.   Holden appear  at   its bar 
to answer  the  particular charges which the  House of  Representatives will 
in due  time exhibit,   and   that  the   Senate  do make  such other and  further 
orders   in  the  premises  as may  seem  to them best calculated   to bring this 
trial   to a  just and  speedy termination;   and   in conclusion  the House  of 
Representatives,   through us,  most heartily prays   that God,   the  God  of 
Eternal   Justice may protect the right.* 
r 
The  committee   that drew up  the   impeachment articles  was  given  the 
authority to  investigate   Holden's  official acts.     It   possessed   the  power 
to  send   for any  papers  or records   it needed,   and   to take testimony under 
oath.     The committee,   nevertheless,   seems  to have drawn up the   articles 
without making any official   investigation.     It apparently relied  upon 
newspaper reports   for  evidence.10     Eight Articles of   Impeachment were 
drafted  and reported   to  the   House,   every charge   being concerned  with the 
activities   of   Holden  during the  "War" with the   Ku Klux Klan.     "The articles 
were   long,   rambling,   political  canards"  one  careful   scholar  has concluded, 
"poorly  drafted,   inaccurate,   and   in all,   fine   illustrations  of  shysterism 
in  investigatorial   workmanship. .,11 
An accurate  summary of the  articles which was given by the prose- 
cution   in   its  opening argument  is  as  follows: 
Article   I  charges   substantially that the accused  corruptly and wickedly 
declared   the  county of Alamance  to be   in "insurrection," whereas  there 
was  no   insurrection;   that he  took military possession of  the county  by 
armed   bands  of   lawless   and desperate men,  organized without   lawful  authority; 
9lbid. ,   I,   7-8. 
10North Carolina  Standard,   December  14,   1870. 
nEwing,   214. 
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and  that he made  unlawful  arrests  of  peaceful  citizens,   whom he   imprisoned, 
beat,   hung  Csic ]   by the   neck,   and otherwise maltreated. 
Article  II  charges   that he   did   the  same  in the  county of  Caswell. 
Article  III  charges  the unlawful   arrest and   imprisonment   of Josiah Turner, 
Jr.,   in  the   county of Orange,   by the  procurement and order of   the  accused. 
Article  IV charges  the  unlawful   arrest and  imprisonment of John Kerr  and 
three other  citizens,   in  the county of Caswell,   by  the procurement  and 
order of  the   accused. 
Article V charges  the   unlawful   arrest and  imprisonment,   in the  county of 
Alamance,   by order  of   the  accused, of Adolphus  G.   Moore,   and  the refusal 
of George W.   Kirk,   acting under and by the  authority of  the accused,   to 
surrender  the   said  Moore,   in obedience  to the writ of habeas  corpus,   to 
the  civil   authorities. 
Article VI   charges   the  arrest of John Kerr and eighteen other   peaceable 
citizens  of  Caswell   County,  and   their detention and  imprisonment,  under 
the orders  of   the accused,  by a   large band of  armed men,   unlawfully  or- 
ganized   into an army and commanded  by George W.   Kirk and  others as  offi- 
cers,   and  the  refusal   of  said  Kirk by the order and command  of   the  accused, 
to  surrender  the  said  citizens  unlawfully held  by him as   prisoners,   to  the 
civil   authorities   in obedience   to the writ of  habeas corpus. 
Article VII   charges   (1)   The  unlawful   organization of an army  of desperate 
men commanded  by Kirk,   Burgen and Yates,  all   desperadoes   from  the  State 
of Tennessee;   (2)     the  hanging  by the neck  in Alamance  County   of William 
Patton and  Lucian  H.   Murray,  and  thrusting   into a  loathsome dungeon Josiah 
Turner,   Jr.,   and  F.  A.   Wiley;   (3)    unlawful   warrants made   by  the accused 
upon  the  treasurer of  the   state,   for   large   sums  of money,   for   the unlaw- 
ful   purpose  of   supporting and maintaining the   lawless  bands  of  armed men 
organized  as  aforesaid. 
Article  VIII   charges  that  the  accused,   as Governor,  made  his warrants   for 
large   sums of money on the  public  treasurer  for the unlawful   purpose of 
paying the  armed  men before mentioned  --  caused and procured   said Treasurer 
to deliver  to one A.   D.   Jenkins,   appointed  by   the accused  to  be paymaster, 
the  sum of   forty  thousand dollars;   that the  Honorable Anderson Mitchell, 
one  of  the   superior court   judges, on application to him made,   issued writs 
of   injunction which were   served upon the  said   treasurer  and  paymaster, 
restraining them from paying said money to  the   said troops;   that  thereupon 
the  accused   incited  and  procured the   said A.   D.   Jenkins   paymaster,   to dis- 
obey the   injunction of  the court and to deliver the money to another  agent 
of  the  accused,   to-wit:     one  John B.   Neathery;   and  thereupon the accused 
ordered and caused  the  said John B.   Neathery to disburse and   pay out  the 
money so delivered  to him,   for   the   illegal   purpose of  paying  the expenses 
of,   and keeping  on foot  the   illegal   military  force  aforesaid.12 
r 
12Holden,   Impeachment  Proceedings,   I,   110-112. 
A complete   text of  the Articles  of  Impeachment  can be  found   in  the 
Impeachment  Proceedings,   I,   9-17.     See also Articles Against W.  W.   Holden 
(Raleigh:     James  H.   Moore,   State Printer and  Binder),   1871. 
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After  adopting the Articles on December  19,   the   House of  Represen- 
tatives elected   seven managers   to conduct  the   impeachment trial   before   the 
Senate.     Those  chosen were C.   W.   Broadfast,  J.  W.   Dunham, G.   H.  Gregory, 
T.   P.   Johnson,   J.  G.   Scott,   Thomas   Sparrow,  and W.   P.  Welch.     Thomas 
Sparrow was  appointed  as  Chairman of   the  Board   of  Managers.     Contrary to 
the usual   practice,   the  House  employed  private  counsel   --  ex-Governor 
Thomas  Bragg,   ex-Governor William A.   Graham,  and  Judge A-   S.   Merriman -- 
to assist  the managers   in the   prosecution of the case.     The two  former 
Governors  had  also been Congressmen.     Graham had  been Secretary  of  Navy, 
and   the Whig candidate  for Vice President   in  1852.     Merriman had   been a 
Superior Court   judge   since  the close  of   the Civil War.     These  ten men 
chosen to prosecute   Holden were all   loyal Conservatives,   and avowed  poli- 
tical  enemies  of  the Governor. 
The  Board  of Managers,   accompanied  by a committee  of  the whole 
House,  went  before  the  Senate   on December  20,   to exhibit  the Articles   of 
impeachment and to demand  that the  Senate take action upon them at  once. 
The   upper  house  acted  immediately and Chief Justice  Pearson was   informed 
that  the  Senate would organize as a court of   impeachment on December 23. 
According to  state   law,   the Chief Justice  of  the state  Supreme  Court  was 
required   to preside when the Governor was  being  impeached.     Among other 
things,   he  had   the  responsibility of   directing  all   forms  of  procedures 
during the  trial,   and deciding all  questions of evidence.     The   Senate 
itself could,   however,   upon  the  demand of one-fifth of   its members,   vote 
upon questions  of evidence.     As will   be  seen,   Holden's   partisan   jurors 
made much use  of  this  privilege. 
The  state Constitution provided  that  "in case of  the   impeachment 
of   the Gove rnor   ....   the powers,  duties and emolutions of  the  office 
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shall  devolve  upon the Lieutenant Governor until   the disabilities  shall 
cease   or  a new Governor shall   be elected and qualified."13     Lieutenant 
Governor Tod R.   Caldwell,   therefore,   after  announcing that  the Senate 
would   take  action upon the   impeachment articles,   gave up his  position 
as   President   of  the   Senate  to assume   the office of Governor,     llolden 
formally  turned  his   office   over to Caldwell   the following day. 
Governor Holden employed  as counsel  Richard Badger,   Nathaniel 
Boyden,   Edward  Conigland,   J.   M.   McCarkle,   and William N.   H.   Smith, all 
five outstanding and  capable members  of  the  state bar. Two of  them 
were   later  to  serve on the   state  Supreme  Court  --  one  as Chief  Justice. 
The Court  of  impeachment was  formed on December  23 ,  when Chief 
Justice  Pearson administered  the oath  to  the   thirty-six Senators  present. 
Governor  Holden,  who had  been summoned to give  his  reply  to the  impeach- 
ment  articles,   was   represented   by a member of his counsel,   R.  C.   Badger. 
When  Holden requested  in writing that the Court allow him thirty days   for 
the  preparation  of  his  answer,   the request was   granted,   and court adjourned 
for one month. 
The   trial   proper  began on January  23,   1871.     Thirteen Senators had 
meanwhile  been added to the Court,  bringing the total  to forty-nine.     Gov- 
ernor   Holden"s  official   reply  to the   impeachment charges was  presented. 
It was  voluminous,   consisting primarily of his messages about  Ku Klux 
outrages  and  the various   proclamations he had   issued.     This answer was  so 
framed as  to clear   the way for the  taking of testimony on Klan depredations. 15 
13 Article   3,  Section   12. 
^Holden attempted  to employ  Zebulon Vance and  B.   F.   Moore,   but 
both declined. 
15The  complete   text of Holden"s  answer can be  found   in llolden, 
Impeachment  Proceedings,   I,   26-54.     See  also W.  W.   Holden.     Answer   to 
the Articles  of Impeachment     (Raleigh:   N.   P.,   1871). 
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The   Republican Senator   from Granville  County had  been removed 
from his   office   by the Conservatives  before  the   impeachment,  and   his  re- 
placement,   L.   C.   Edwards,   did  not appear until   February   1.     (See   page   33) 
When Edwards  asked   to  be  seated as  a member of  the Court,   Holden"s  defense 
objected.     It was   argued   that  he   had  not  been a member of  the Court when 
it was   formed  and  to add  him would  be  tantamount   to "packing"   the Court. 
The  Chief Justice  overruled  the  challenge and   Edwards  was  seated. 
An attempt was made during the  trial   to  increase  the number   of 
charges  against  the Governor.     A ninth article  of   impeachment,   which 
charged  Holden with being  involved with the reconstruction railroad   frauds, 
was   introduced   into the  House   of Representatives  on February  10.16     When 
Holden was   informed   of  the charge,   he wired G.   W.  Swepson,   president of 
the railroad   involved,   that  if  the charge  were  pressed,   it would  be  nec- 
essary  for him to come   to Raleigh to testify.     Swepson telegraphed   the 
members who  had drafted  the charge   that  Holden was   innocent,  and   that  if 
they  insisted  on  introducing   the charge   he would   testify   in the Governor's 
favor.     The  article was  apparently  never  reported  out of  the committee 
to which   it  had  been referred.     It was  never presented  to  the  Senate,  and 
it was not mentioned  thereafter by  the press.     In all  probability  the 
charge  was  stopped  by Conservative   leaders who  feared  that evidence would 
show that  they were connected with the  frauds  and were as guilty as  the 
Republicans.17 
The somewhat   lengthy   forty-four day  impeachment  trial   of Governor 
Holden was  described  by  one observer as   "—  somewhat  tedious,   interspersed 
16For  the  complete  text of   the  article  see The  Raleigh Sentinel, 
February   10,   1871. 
17Raper,   "W. W.   Holden,"  396. 
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.   .   .  with  spicy debates upon admissibility of  testimony."18     Thomas 
Sparrow opened  the case   for the  prosecution on  February  2,   and  sixty- 
one witnesses were summoned  to  substantiate the   impeachment  articles. 
On February  18,   the  twentieth day of  the  trial,   the  prosecution closed 
its  case.     Holden's  defense  began its case  five  days   later when Edward 
Conigland  delivered  the opening argument.     One   hundred-thirteen witnesses 
testified  on Holden's  behalf,   chief  of whom was  James   E.   Boyd,   a former 
(Clansman.     The defense ended   its case  on  March   14,   the  thirty-seventh 
day of  the   trial.     The  closing arguments   lasted   for  six days.     Ex-Governors 
Thomas  Bragg and W.  A.   Graham presented the arguments   for  the   prosecution; 
Nathaniel   Boyden and William  Smith spoke   for the defense.     The  trial  ended 
on March 21,   there  having been scarcely a  session in which  the  Klan had 
not  figured prominently.     The  vote which removed  Holden from office was 
taken the  following day. 
The reasons   for William Holden's   impeachment were   political  and 
social,   rather  than being based on the criminal   charges with which he  was 
confronted.     The   list  of charges  in the Articles of  Impeachment was   intro- 
duced as  a  rationalization to   justify the overthrow of  the  Holden adminis- 
tration,   and the  real reason for  impeachment was   the  Republican assault  upon 
white   supremacy.     Holden's only crime was   that   he had  given  the Negro the 
right to vote.     He had made no attempt  to break with the  social  and econo- 
mic  aspects   of  white  rule,   but he  had supported  political  equality.     As 
long as   the   Negroes  remained  political equals,   the   Holden administration 
could  never have  been accepted. 
The partisan-political   nature of  the entire   proceedings  became 
ISThe Wilmington Journal,   February 24,   1871. 
33 
obvious  even before   the actual   impeachment.     Almost all  writers of   North 
Carolina Reconstruction history,   prejudiced or otherwise,   admit  the  exis- 
tense   of undiluted   partisanship  throughout   the   four-month period.     Indeed 
"there  has   scarcely  occurred an impeachment proceeding   in the  United 
States  which has more   forcibly  presented the  general   political  character 
of  impeachment." 
Before  the   impeachment resolution was   introduced   into  the  House, 
the Conservatives   had   feared they would  not be able to command the  two- 
thirds  vote   necessary  for  removing  Holden from office.     To guarantee   the 
Conservatives  an  absolute  voting majority,   they removed  three  Republicans 
from  the House   of  Representatives  and three  from the  Senate.     The  Repub- 
lican  Senator from Granville County was   replaced  by L.   C.   Edwards,   a Con- 
servative.     The   two  Republican Senators  from Alamance and Caswell   counties 
were  deprived  of   their  seats  on the  grounds  that  free elections  had  been 
impossible  during  the occupation of   these  counties   by Kirk's   troops.     A 
new election was   called  and both were  replaced  by Conservatives.     In the 
House of Representatives,   the Republicans   from Alamance  and Caswell   were 
replaced  in a new election by Conservatives  because  the  county officials 
had counted  the vote of  Kirk's men while   they were  serving in the  "in- 
surrection counties".20 After this   partisan action  the Conservatives  possessed 
an absolute  two-thirds majority   in both houses.     There  were  now  in  the 
Senate  thirty-six  Conservatives  and   fourteen Republicans;   in the  House 
there were  seventy-five  Conservatives,   forty-two Republicans,  and   three 
independents. 
19Ewing,   224. 
20Holden, Memoirs, 171.  See also Raper, "W. W. Holden,"  387. 
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During  the   trial   the  partisan Conservatives   overruled  the decision 
of  the Chief Justice   in   favor of   the  prosecution nine  times  out  of  ten 
when there  was  an uncertain   issue.     They also prevented  the   introduction 
of  relevant  evidence  by  the defense  on a number of  occasions.     This was 
especially  true  concerning the   introduction of evidence   regarding  the 
Ku  Klux outside  of Alamance  and Caswell.     The  defense   sought  to   introduce 
such  testimony on  five  different occasions,   and each time  the Conservatives 
vetoed   it. 
The evidence   introduced   by the  prosecution was   often partisan and 
doubtful .     Much  of   the   testimony was   based   on Conservative  newspaper re- 
ports  rather than on  facts.     The most  striking   illustration of  this was 
21 the   introduction   in evidence  of   the   files   of Josiah Turner's  Sentinel. 
A more partisan, biased and emotional newspaper would have been difficult 
to locate. William Smith, speaking for the defense, was not exaggerating 
when he  said of   the  Sentinel: 
The  prosecution has   produced   in evidence   to affect  the  governor  harsh and 
violent  paragraphs   from a political   paper opposed   to him.   .   .   .  The   state- 
ments   in   that paper are  in many  particulars quite  unlike   the  facts  as   they 
came  out   in evidence on  this   trial.     It   is  an excited  partisan  press. 22 
The  outcome was determined  from  the  beginning  by a caucus   of Con- 
servative   leaders.     It was  decided  not only to remove Governor   Holden  from 
office,   but also  to disqualify him  from ever again holding public   office 
in  the  state.     A number of Conservatives were originally opposed  to  this 
decision,   and   intended   to vote   against conviction.     But those who were 
21Holden,   Impeachment Proceedings,   I,   1014ff. 
22Ibid.,   III,   2418. 
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reluctant about removing  Holden,  were  threatened,   and   the Ku  Klux  Klan 
brought  its whole   power  to bear  upon them.23    On the day Holden's   fate 
was  to be voted upon,   two Conservative   Senators  arrived  so deeply   in- 
toxicated  that  the  doorkeeper  had to   lead  them into the   Senate  chamber.24 
The  vote   for  removal was   strictly a party vote.     The  thirty-six Conser- 
vatives   present voted unanimously  for removal;   the  thirteen Republicans 
voted, to a man,   for   acquital.     (See  page  83) 
At  least one Conservative   Senator expressed   in his written opinion 
that the  trial   had   not been fair.     Said  Senator R.  M.   Norment: 
I  was  not   as  free from prejudice  against  the  accused  as   1   should 
have  been and  as   I   desired  to be.     The many reports,   ex  parte as   they 
doubtless were,   which came   to my ears  through the  public  press  before the 
meeting of  this  general   assembly,   and which,  without  intermission,   have 
been   industriously  circulated  almost  up to  the present  hour,   were well 
calculated  to warp  the   judgment and  bias   the minds  of   jurors who  belonged 
to the  political   party of which those  papers were  the  accredited  organs.25 
A number   of  the  Conservative  papers denied   that  the   impeachment 
had been a party measure.     The Wilmington Journal wrote that   if   the   im- 
peachment had  been for  partisan reasons,   it would  have  been useless.     It 
pointed out  that  Lieutenant Governor Caldwell,   who replaced  the Governor, 
was,   like  Holden,   a radical   Republican,   and was  "certainly as  objection- 
able  politically   to the  Conservatives  of  North Carolina as  Governor  Holden 
can possibly  be."26 This  argument could never  prove  wholly convincing,   for 
the Conservatives   believed  that if  Holden were  removed from power,   the 
entire Republican Party could soon be  overthrown. 
23Raper,   "W.  W.   Holden," 402. 
24Holden, Memoirs, 172. 
25Holden, Impeachment Proceedings, III, Appendix, 10. 
26The Wilmington Journal, January 6, 1871. 
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The trial   did not seem to create a great deal  of  interest   in the 
state outside  the capital  city,  perhaps  because the outcome  was  a  foregone 
conclusion.     This was   true  in  spite   of the efforts of  the  Raleigh Sentinel 
to excite  the   public  about "the great event of the century".     The  galleries 
and  lobbies of  the  Senate were  crowded with  interested   spectators almost 
every day during the  proceedings,   but even  in Raleigh the  interest   in the 
trial  was not  as  great  as   the   Sentinel maintained.     One contemporary  said: 
I  do not   feel   the  trial  of William W.   Holden excites very much pub- 
lic   interest.     It  is  true  that the   galleries  and   lobbies are generally 
crowded  during the  session.   .   .,   and when the weather  permits  about  a 
dozen  ladies   .   .   .  grace   the   scene.     But  there  seems  to be   an  impression 
that the  result of  the  trial   is a  foregone  conclusion,   and  hence  that   in- 
terest does  not attach to  it  that would be  excited by a doubtful   contest. 
This same attitude was  expressed by many of  the  states'   newspapers,   both 
Conservative and Republican.     The   attitude  of the   Salisbury Old  North 
State  toward  the   impeachment was  typical.     Having rarely commented  upon 
the proceedings  during  the entire   trial,   the editor wrote  concerning 
lblden's removal   that   "this  announcement will   produce  but   little excite- 
ment or  sensation,   inasmuch as   it   has been expected  from the beginning."2° 
27Ibid. ,   February 24,   1871. 
2H March 2k,   1871. 
CHAPTER  IV 
AN  UNLAWFUL  STATE  OF  INSURRECTION1 
The  most  serious  charge  brought against Governor Holden,   which 
constituted   the major  part   of  the  first and   second  articles   of   impeach- 
ment,  was  that he   declared  an unlawful   state of   insurrection   in the  coun- 
ties of Alamance  and  Caswell.     The crux of  the whole  case was   the  Shoffner 
Act of   1869,   and   the  prosecution took   the  position  that  this  act did not, 
as   the defense  had   argued,   authorize   the Governor  to declare  either county 
in a state   of   insurrection.     The  concepts   "insurrection" and  "martial   law" 
were discussed   in great detail   by  both the  prosecution and   the defense   in 
an attempt   to give   them  the meaning each desired.     The  prosecution pre- 
sented evidence  to prove  that  the   state  of society   in both counties was 
tranquil,   and  that   the civil   authorities were capable of maintaining  law 
and order.     The defense,   on the other hand,   argued   that   the  civil   law was 
powerless,   because  both counties were under the control   of   the  Ku  Klux 
Klan.     Evidence of   the  numerous  atrocities   of  the  Klan,   for which no  one 
had  been  found  guilty,   was  presented.     While  the  prosecution maintained 
that Governor  Holden acted   to control   the   approaching elections,   the de- 
fense  argued   that  he  only  took  such a drastic   step after  trying every 
other means  available   to restore   law and   order  to  the counties   involved. 
The defense's entire  case  rested  upon the  assumption  that   the 
Unless   otherwise   indicated,   the   information contained   in Chapters 
IV,   V,  and  VI comes  from,   Holden,   Impeachment   Proceedings. 
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Shoffner Act did in fact authorize Governor Holden to declare the counties 
of Alamance and Caswell in a state of insurrection and to establish martial 
law.  The state constitution designated the Governor as commander-in-chief 
of the state militia, but under the existing law, he could not send them 
into a county unless the magistrates requested it. 
The relevant sections of the Shoffner Act of December 16, 1869 
were these: 
Section 1:  That the governor is hereby authorized and empowered whenever 
in his judgment the civil authorities in any county are unable to protect 
its citizens in the enjoyment of life and property, to declare such county 
to be in a state of insurrection and to call into active service the mili- 
tia of the state to such an extent as may become necessary to suppress 
such insurrection; and in such case the governor is further authorized to 
call upon the president for such assistance, if any, as in his judgment 
may be necessary to enforce the law. 
Section 3:  That the expenses attending the calling of the militia into 
active service as herein provided shall be paid by the treasurer of the 
state upon the warrant of the governor and it shall be the duty of the 
commissioners of the county declared to be in a state of insurrection and 
in which such service was rendered, to reimburse within one year the 
treasurer of the state the expenses thus paid. 
Section 5:  That all laws or clauses of laws in conflict with this act 
are hereby repealed.* 
The prosecution attacked the Shoffner Act on the grounds that it 
was unconstitutional, and therefore did not authorize Holden to declare 
the counties of Alamance and Caswell in a state of insurrection.  This 
they seem to have stated as an axiom needing no proof.  No analysis was 
made of the act to show in what ways it conflicted with the state consti- 
tution.  Assuming the unconstitutionality of the Shoffner Act, the prose- 
2Public Laws of North Carolina (1869-1870), Chap. 27, pp. 64-66. 
3This presumably established a precedent that an impeachment court 
may, for all practical purposes, declare unconstitutional an act of the 
legislature through the conviction of a state officer who sought to enforce 
it. 
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cution argued  that  Holden had used  his   influence  to   its  fullest extent  to 
induce   the   legislature   to pass  the  act, which both knew was  not constitu- 
tional.     The Governor  and   the   legislature had  a common design,   they main- 
tained,   of  conferring upon Holden certain unwarranted  and unauthorized 
powers. 
Even  if  the   Shoffner Act were  constitutional,   the   prosecution 
maintained categorically  that it could not give  the Governor any  authority 
not conferred upon him by the Constitution of   North Carolina which stated 
in Article   1   --  Section  24:     ".   .   .as  standing armies   in  time of   peace are 
dangerous   to  liberty,   they ought not to be  kept up,   and the military  should 
be  kept under strict  subordination to,   and governed  by,   the civil   power." 
Basing their  argument  upon this article,   the prosecution maintained  that 
the absolute  suspension of civil  authority by  Holden  in both counties,   and 
its  replacement by martial   law was  contrary  to  the constitution  and conse- 
quently unlawful.     They maintained  that when  using military authority,   it 
must always  be   to aid   the  civil   authority --   never  to replace   it. 
The  defense   ignored  the charge  that  Holden's   purpose   in pushing 
the  Shoffner Act  through  the   state   legislature was   to subvert  the  state, 
and concerned  themselves with the constitutionality of  the Act.     They 
argued  that   it was  the   judicial   branch that must decide whether   or not 
an act was  constitutional,   not   the executive.     Since  no   judicial   body 
had ever  questioned   the constitutionality of   the Act,   the  defense main- 
tained   that  Holden  assumed  it  to be  constitutional.     It was  pointed  out 
that  the  governor  of   North Carolina did  not  possess   the veto or  any 
equivalent  power  and  could not dispense with   laws or  suspend  their exe- 
cution even   if  he  desired.     Even  if   the   law were unconstitutional,   the 
defense  argued   that  no doctrine was   better established   than the   principle 
that,  whether a  law  is  constitutional   or not   it  is   the  right and   the  duty 
of  the  governor  to carry that  law into execution until  it has  been offi- 
cially  invalidated  by the  proper   judicial  authority.     It was  pointed out 
that the  governor was  an executive officer bound  to enforce all  the   laws 
of  the   state and  he  had  no right  under any circumstance,  and certainly 
not in a doubtful   case,   to  suspend or resist   the declared will of   the 
law-making power,  even  if  he   himself  felt  the act was  unconstitutional. 
The defense  reminded  the court  that at  the  trial  of Andrew John- 
son,   the  prosecution used   the argument opposite  to that used   by  Holden's 
prosecution.     Johnson's  prosecution argued   that  he   had  no discretionary 
power  to  judge   the constitutionality of an act,  whereas  llolden's  main- 
tained   that  he  did.     There was  also  talk of  impeaching Governor Tod Cald- 
well   if  he did  not carry out  the Convention Act by calling a state  conven- 
tion to revise  the  constitution.       This   led   the defense to  ask  if   Holden 
would   be   impeached  for  obeying one  act  and Caldwell   for disobeying another. 
The defense  also argued  that  Holden acted  within the provisions 
of  the   Shoffner Act and  in the  circumstances  contemplated  by the   legisla- 
ture  in enacting the   law.     It was maintained  that  the act  was  passed with 
full   knowledge  of   its  effect,   and of   the extraordinary powers with which 
it undertook to  invest  the  governor.     The  defense contended  that   the  act 
was  intended  to arrest   lawlessness  and crime.     Because   the   judicial  pro- 
cess   had proved   inadequate   to afford   protection,   it was  thought  that an 
extreme  remedy had  become   necessary.     Therefore when the Governor came 
to the  conclusion that  the  civil   authorities were  in  fact unable  to  pro- 
tect   life and  property,   he  was  not only authorized,   but it  became  his  duty 
to declare Alamance  and Caswell  counties   in a state  of   insurrection.     As 
'*The  Wilmington Journal,   February  2k,   1871. 
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Nathaniel   Boyden put  it:     "He would  have rendered   himself  liable  to impeach- 
ment before  this very court and  removed   from office had   he  remained  idle   
had  he  failed  to use  the  power  conferred on him for the  protection of both."5 
The  prosecution insisted   that the case depended upon the actual 
meaning of  the  concepts  "insurrection"  and  "martial   law".     A number of 
authorities  were cited,   and   it was maintained   that the  number  could be 
multiplied  almost   indefinitely,   in an attempt to define "insurrection"   in 
such a way as   to  prove  that  no  such state existed   in either county involved. 
An insurrection,   the  prosecution concluded,   is  a  rising,  open,   active,   and 
violent,   of  a number of persons   in opposition to   the execution of   the   law. 
"An insurrection is where   there   is a combination  for  the purpose  and with 
the view to  resist   the  government;   for  insurrection  is  a crime   leveled  at 
the government directly."6 
As   for martial   law,   the   prosecution maintained   that  all   authorities, 
however much they disagree,  at   least concur  that  it can only be  exercised 
in times  of war --   flagrant war  -- and not   in such a  state   of things   as 
was alleged   to have  prevailed  in either Alamance  or Caswell   county.     To 
be a war  there must  be an attempt  to overthrow  the government,   and  it  was 
maintained   that evidence   proved   no such attempt   had  been made. 
The  reply of   Holden's  defense was   that  the very object of the   Ku 
Klux Klan in both counties   had  been to overthrow the   laws  of  the  country 
and  prevent  their execution.     This attempt  to  overthrow the   laws,   the 
defense maintained,  was   treason.     It was  true  that the Klan worked  in 
secret  in an attempt   to  prevent detection,   but   it was   nevertheless guilty 
of  treason.     The   laws   here referred   to were  the  Reconstruction acts 
5Holden,   Impeachment  Proceedings,   III,   2381, 
6Ibid.,   I,   321. 
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and amendments which gave the Negroes certain rights and privileges. 
Since the majority of Holden's jurors believed in white supremacy and 
condemned the Reconstruction laws as unconstitutional, it is doubtful 
that this argument was very convincing to them.  Nevertheless, the de- 
fense argued that such a lawless situation as existed in both counties 
did constitute insurrection, and that no authority could be found which 
would say that military power might not be invoked to insure the lives 
and property of the people. 
Denying that a state of war must exist before martial law might 
be used, Holden's defense maintained that it could be employed in those 
cases where extreme necessity — such as existed in Alamance and Caswell 
counties -- required it.  The defense retorted that the authority of a 
state to declare martial law had already been upheld in Luther v. Borden 
(1849), and in Martin v. Mott (1827) the United States Supreme Court had 
already held that the president, empowered to declare martial law, should 
be the judge of the necessity for invoking it. 
One of the most important issues in the trial was, of course, 
whether or not an actual state of insurrection existed in the two counties 
involved.  The prosecution insisted that the only insurrection which had 
occurred had been an imaginary one which Holden had himself created on 
paper.  It was argued that the state of conditions in both counties had 
been generally tranquil.  In spite of the evidence presented by the de- 
fense, the prosecution contended that it had not been proved that any 
Klan organization existed at all in Caswell,7 and that in Alamance its 
7This argument was proved to be completely false in 1935 when 
John G. Lea, the organizer of the Klan in Caswell County, revealed a 
great deal of information concerning the Klan in that county.   Raleigh 
News and Observer,   Oct. 6, 1935. 
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affect on the   administration of   justice  had   been very slight.     In support 
of the   proposition  that a  state  of   insurrection did  not exist   in either 
county,   a number of   Conservatives  from both counties   testified,   among 
other   things,   that   there was   no resistance   to the  execution of  the   law; 
that  there was  no danger   to Negroes;   that  there was  no  hostility  between 
the white and   Negro  races;   that  as  a general   rule   there was   no danger to 
cither   race  because  of   their  political   opinions;   and that Negroes were 
fairly employed.     As   the  Raleigh  Sentinel   stated   it:     "They testified to 
a man   .   .   .   that no  secret political   society existed  or exists.   .   .   ."8 
llolden's defense,   on  the  other  hand,   attempted,   primarily  through 
the   introduction of evidence   of   the   atrocities and depredations  of  the 
Klan in the  two counties   involved,   to  prove   that a state of   insurrection 
did  in   fact exist.     The   prosecution,   of course,   sought  to prevent   intro- 
duction  of such evidence   on  the grounds  that   it was   not  germane   to  the 
charges   of  the  impeachment.     After more  than three days   of  arguments,   how- 
ever,   the presiding Chief Justice   ruled   in  favor of   the defense.     Thus 
they were  successful   in presenting over one-thousand  pages  of  evidence 
concerning the   Klan   in   the counties  of Alamance  and Caswell.     The defense 
attempted to offer   proof  of   Klan atrocities   in other  counties   later,   but 
the Court refused   to admit  this evidence.     The  defense was  therefore un- 
able   to verify the   statements   it made   about  the  Klan outside Alamance  and 
Caswell  counties.     There was   no  lack  of evidence,   however,   in either Ala- 
mance   or Caswell,   for  witness  after  witness  described  the  outrages of  the 
Klan  in their most  gruesome  details. 
The   most common of  these  crimes charged   to the  Klan was   the beating 
of Negroes.     The   following case,   as   told   by Damon Holt,  was a typical   example. 
f 
8The Raleigh Sentinel , February 13, 1871. 
They called me   [about midnightj   and I  wouldn't answer.     They said,   "Come 
out of there;   if you don't come out of   there   .   .   .   I'll   shoot you."     I   got 
up and came  on out,   and  they gathered me,   one by  the  arm and one  by the 
hand,   and  told me  "to follow them,   .   .   .   that  they were going to hang me." 
They took a stick and  punched me in the back and made me   follow them out 
in the woods.   .   .,   and  there  they took my  shirt off and made me  hug around 
a tree,   and gave me about  sixty   licks,   I  reckon.     Four whipped me at a 
time;   and   then they  turned me   loose  and told me   to run.     I   then took a 
run down  into the  hollow.   .   ,x  and   they shot at me.     I   ran   .   .   .   into the 
barn and   lay there all  night. 9 
Other  Negroes,   not so fortunate,   told of being hanged and beaten 
until  unconscious  before  being released;   of  being choked with a  rope;   and 
of being beaten with a club.     In several  instances  the  Klan was  not satis- 
fied with chastizing the  head of the   household,   but  also went  as   far as 
to tear  their victim's   house  down to   the bottom  log.     Mary Gappins ,   for 
example,   a prostitute who  had   her house  torn down,  was   forced   to   live  in 
a tent.     One  Negro  baby died   from being trampled upon by Klansmen,  another 
from being struck across   the   face with a club. 
White Republicans   testified   that  they,   like  the Negroes,  were  at 
the mercy of  the Klan in both counties,  and that  they were  threatened 
with death if they did not conform to   the will  of their  oppressors.     One 
white man was  cudgelled   for being at a Negro's   house;   another for allowing 
Negroes   to   live on his   land.     A man and   his  wife were  badly beaten for 
inviting a  Negro   into  church and   for  teaching   in colored   schools.     Still 
another was made   to get down on  his knees  and pray for   the  Klan. 
Evidence was  also presented   to show that the  Klan  had  been guilty 
of murder on a number of occasions   in both counties.     Watt Outlaw,   a 
leader of the   Union League,  was  hanged  in the  public   square of Graham a 
few days  after  the passage  of  the  Shoffner Act.     A Negro  named  Puryear, 
who claimed  he   had evidence   concerning the death of  Outlaw,  was drowned 
it 
9Holden Impeachment  Proceedings,     II,   1382. 
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by the  Klan.     It was asserted that  the  Klan had   planned   to kill every 
adult Republican male citizen of Graham,   had  they not escaped.     The  Klan 
itself  probably made  this   affirmation but  it  is  doubtful   that   they would 
have carried   it  out. 
Perhaps   the   boldest act was   the murder   of   state  senator John 
Stephens.     While  political  debates were   taking place at  the  court  house 
in Yanceyville  during  May,   1870,   Stephens was enticed away,  and then 
found  the  next morning with a rope  almost buried   in  the muscles  of  his 
neck and with   fatal   stabs   in his chest and neck.     While   it could  not  be 
proved at the   time  of   Holden's  trial   that the  Klan killed  Stephens,   the 
affair has  now apparently  been solved.     The  Klan  leader of Caswell   divulged 
sixty-five  years   later   that he witnessed  Klansmen murder Stephens.10    Shoff- 
ner,   the  state   senator  who had   introduced  the act bearing his  name,  was 
forced  to   leave   the  state  to escape death.     James  E.   Boyd,   a  former  Klans- 
man,   testified  that he   met  the Klan party that  planned   to kill   Shoffner. 
In the   face of   the  overwhelming evidence  presented  by  the defense, 
the prosecution admitted   that a  number  of outrages  had  been committed   in 
both counties,   but the  attorneys   still   protested  that  these   offenses were 
not serious enough to   justify  the Governor's declaring  the  counties   in a 
state  of   insurrection.     The  position taken was   that  the crimes committed 
in the counties   of Alamance and Caswell  were  no more   serious   than  those 
in any other county —   indeed   in any  other  state!     As   Thomas   Sparrow put   it: 
"The   outrages   in Alamance and Caswell   do not vary from similar ones occur- 
f 
ring   in all   parts  of  the country every year,   and every month of  the  year. ..12 
10The   Raleigh  News  and  Observer,  October  6,   1935. 
HHolden,   Impeachment  Proceedings,   I,   992. 
!2ibid. ,   108. 
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The   reasoning of  the  prosecution on this  point cannot be understood 
except  in   light of   the   "southern mind"    during  this  period,     A large   portion 
of the  population of  North Carolina  in  1871 evidently  believed  that  the 
punishment  which the  Negroes  and white  Republicans   had  received was  well 
deserved.     This  attitude was expressed  by the  prosecution when William 
Graham described  Holden's witnesses  as  a  ".   .   .   long procession   ...   of 
harlots,   adulterors,   thieves,   and  other vicious characters   not  infrequently 
subjects   of unlawful   treatment   in any community."13     The  Conservative  press 
expressed   the   same view.     "The   lobbies  are   thronged with quite a motley crew 
of witnesses   summoned   for   the defense.   .   .   to  prove outrages etc.  and no 
doubt every  thief who   has met with well merited   punishment will   tell   his 
tale  to  justify the   illegal  acts  of  Holden."14 
The  prosecution clothed   its  prejudice  in the  argument   that   these 
men were  all   guilty of  some  crime   like  stealing.     The defense,   however, 
maintained   that  this was  at  best  a flimsy rationalization.     The  prosecution 
argued   that   the  Klan's  victims  were  criminals,   but   it may well  be doubted 
that  they ever  produced  a single  piece of  evidence against any of them. 
It was maintained  by  the   prosecution that even  if  any unusual  out- 
break of crime   had  occurred   in either Alamance  or Caswell   county,  civil 
authorities   should   have  been used   to  suppress   it.     The  civil  authorities 
in both counties,   it was  affirmed,  were capable of maintaining   law and 
order,   and  there  was   no  need   for military assistance.     And   if  there   had 
been a need   for military assistance   (so ran the argument),   the   federal 
troops which were  stationed  in both counties  could  have  easily  handled 
the  situation.     At  the   time Governor   Holden declared  Alamance County   in 
13Ibid. ,   III,   2285. 
lz+The Wilmington Journal,   March 3,   1871. 
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a state of  insurrection,   he  requested and  received  federal   troops   from 
President Grant,  which remained   in both Alamance  and Caswell  counties 
until  after  Kirk's   troops   had   left.     Furthermore,   the  prosecution argued, 
after the  arrival   of   the   federal   troops,   peace and quiet   prevailed  in 
both counties,   and what   lawlessness   there  had  been ceased. 
The evidence  of the  defense  did  not   agree with this  argument,   but 
no reply was made  concerning the   federal   troops.     Instead,   they emphasized 
the  inability of   the civil  authorities  to maintain  law and order,   and 
asserted   that the  civil   law was   powerless  because  the governments  of 
both counties were  controlled  by  the  Klan.     Not only,   they argued,   did 
the civil  authorities   fail   to bring  to   justice  those of   the Klan who 
violated   the   law;   they  actually  shielded  them from arrest and  punishment. 
Not one  person,   the defense  pointed out,   had  been arrested in either 
county  for any of   the multitude  of  crimes   and  felonies  committed by   the 
Klan. 
From evidence   presented  by  the  defense,   it was established  that 
a number of  officials   in  both counties were Klan members.     In Alamance, 
for example,   the   sheriff,  deputy sheriff,  magistrates,   and  justices-of- 
the-peace were  all   Klansmen.     In addition,   a number of  officials who were 
not members  were   in sympathy with the movement.     While   it is   impossible 
to know how many  officials were Klansmen,   the defense probably over- 
dramatized   this   point.     Even more damaging  to  the   processes of civil   law 
was   the  assertion of   the  defense   that   those who desired   justice were 
afraid   to  administer   it.     One   judge was  said  to have endangered   his   life 
by  letting   it  be  known  that  he  desired   to bring guilty  Klansmen to   justice. 
Another  official   swore   that   he   had  been afraid  to interfere with the mur- 
der of Watt Outlaw. 
Perhaps   the most  important question connected  with the  ability 
' 
of  the  civil   authorities   to  suppress   the  Klan was  that of  the effective- 
ness  of  the courts.     The  prosecution evaded   the real   issue  by refusing 
to recognize   the difference  between actual   justice  and  the external 
machinery of   justice.     That   is  to say,   they  ignored   Holden's  charge   that 
the courts met only as  a matter of  form,  and   insisted  that as   long as 
the courts  were open,   they were effective.     They also maintained  that 
the courts   in  both counties   had   tried   criminal  cases,   and  that   judgments 
of the most  serious   nature   had  been pronounced  and were  being executed. 
But   they  ignored   the   fact  that no  guilty Klansman   had  been convicted   in 
cither county.     The circumstance  that   the courts   tried a number of  indi- 
viduals  and  found   them guilty had,   in  fact,   no relationship  to   the crimes 
committed  by   the   Klan. 
The  defense maintained   that  while  the   judicial   power   in both 
counties was,   for  the most part,   in the  hands  of energetic men,   they 
had not been  able  to  bring guilty (Clansmen to   justice,  and   that even if 
they were arrested,   it was  almost   impossible to  convict  them because 
Klan members  were   sworn to go  to their rescue at  all   hazards,   to swear 
for  them as  witnesses,   and aquit  them as   jurors.     Grand   juries,   therefore, 
refused  to  find   true   bills  against members  of  the  Klan for  the  gravest 
crimes  and   petit   juries refused  to convict   them.     Holden,   in his reply 
to the court  said:      "Magistrates   failed to  act.     Judges and  Solicitors 
of  the district attended  the courts  merely as  a matter of form,  a reign 
of  terror existed  and  administration of  justice  was wholly  impeded." 
The  defense  argued  that   the  voting  privileges  of  the   Negroes   in 
Alamance  and  Caswell   counties   had  been discriminated  against,   while,   the 
prosecution  produced  Conservatives   to  testify  that  this was  not  true. 
« 
15 Holden. Impeachment  Proceedings,   I, 42. 
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They argued  that "this was merely one  of  the old  devices of   the  party  to 
hold every colored man to his  party-fealty and  insure  his  attendance at 
the  polls,   by  saying his  right   to  suffrage was  threatened."16 
As a matter   of  fact,   the  prosecution argued that  the  reason Holden 
had declared  a  state  of  insurrection  in Alamance  and Caswell   counties was 
to control   the elections.     Holden,   it  was   charged,   had  met with the Repub- 
lican  leaders early   in 1870  to discuss   the  August elections.     Realizing 
that the  Republican Party was   in great danger of   being defeated,   they 
decided  to  "send  Kirk's  force   to Alamance  and Caswell   to degrade  and bring 
on a collision,   to  produce  confusion and   thereby affect the  pending election.' 
"Kirk's   force was  wanted   for  no  purpose   but  to control   the election and make 
a   last desperate effort  to preserve   the  ascendency of   the  party."18 
The defense,   for  some undisclosed   reason,  failed  to  comment upon 
this  point.     Instead,   they  steadily declared  that Holden did  not  proclaim 
that a state  of insurrection existed  until   he  had exhausted every other 
means of  preserving  the   public   peace,   and   then only with utmost  reluctance. 
The defense  reviewed  the months  preceeding  the  declaration of   insurrection 
in Alamance,   pointing out   how Holden  had   tried every  peaceful means avail- 
able   to bring   law and order  to Alamance  and Caswell.     Four  proclamations 
were  issued,   and even after the   legislature  had   been  forced   to pass the 
Shoffner Act,   Holden hoped   the  Klan could   be put down by the civil  auth- 
orities.     He  thought  that merely declaring  the   counties   in a  state of 
insurrection might accomplish his  purpose  of  reestablishing order,   but 
the Klan grew stronger with his every move.     Finally he  had  no choice   but 
,J7 
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to use  force.     The defense   took the position that   the evidence   produced 
proved   that   the   situation  in both counties was  so  serious that  it demanded 
the extreme action Governor   Holden was   finally  forced   to take.     As  a matter 
of fact,   said   they,   "Holden was   in great error   in that   he did not proceed 
long before  he did to call   in the military and  put a  stop to this  carnival 
of murder and  outrage. J9 I 
19Ibid.,   2361. 
CHAPTER  V 
THE  "DENIAL"  OF  PROCEDURAL  RIGHTS 
Four of  the Articles  of Impeachment charged   Holden with denying 
to persons  procedural   rights  guaranteed  them by the  state constitution. 
The   lower  house  charged   in Articles   IV, V,  and  VI   that the Governor  had 
ordered George   Kirk,   the  Commander of  Holden's   special   forces,   to arrest 
without warrant a number of citizens   in Alamance and Caswell   counties,   and 
had denied   these   prisoners  the writ of habeas  corpus.     The  crucial   issue 
In these  two charges was  whether or   not  the  act of declaring a county in 
a state of   insurrection and under martial   law suspended   the   normal  pro- 
cedural rights  of   its citizens.     In both  instances   the  attorneys   for the 
prosecution refused   to analyze   this   issue   in an  impartial  and  objective 
manner.     Instead,   they based  their  arguments  upon the assumption that  no 
state of   insurrection  had existed   in either county.     From this  premise 
the  prosecution concluded  that  the   same  constitutional  rights  which had 
been  in effect  in the  other ninety-eight  counties  had  prevailed  in Ala- 
mance and  Caswell   as well.     The  defense,   on the other hand,   argued  that 
these  procedural   rights   had been   legally  suspended   by the declaration of 
a state of  insurrection. 
The  prosecution based  its  entire  argument upon Articles   I   and  II, 
which charged  that Governor  Holden  had declared  an unlawful   state  of  in- 
surrection in Alamance  and Caswell   counties.     His  conviction or acquittal 
of  the  charges   in Articles  IV,  V,  and VI  would  seem  to  have  been dependent 
upon  the Court's decision on the  first  two articles.     Nevertheless  the 
' 
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Court acquitted   Holden  of the  charge   that he   had declared  an unlawful   state 
of  insurrection,   and at  the   same time   voted  to remove   him from office   for 
suspending certain  procedural  rights   in Alamance and Caswell.     Such  logic 
can be understood only   in  light of   the   partisan nature  of  the  Court. 
A different  issue was   involved   in the  charge of  Article  III   that 
Governor  Holden had ordered   the unlawful  arrest of  Josiah Turner,  Jr.   in 
Orange County.     Since   the arrest   had   taken place outside   the   two insur- 
rectionary counties,   the procedural   rights  guaranteed  by  the state con- 
stitution were without  question in effect.     The   issue was   simply whether 
or not the Governor   had  ordered  the  arrest. 
« 
Holden admitted,   in his  reply to the   impeachment  charge,   that  he 
had ordered  Kirk  to arrest without warrant a number of men  in both Ala- 
mance and Caswell.     Evidence   presented  by the   prosecution showed  that, 
while Holden's order issued   through his Adjutant General   to Kirk had  not 
contained  the   names of   the men to be  arrested,   the Governor had  presented 
Kirk with such a   list   in a  private   letter. 
The appeal of the prosecution to the Court's emotions was nowhere 
better illustrated than in its arguments relating to this charge. In his 
closing argument W.  A.   Graham told   the   Court: 
The  object   £of   Holden]   seemed   to be   to  strike   terror   into the 
country by seizing men of known respectability and  character.   .   .   . 
Hiving declared Caswell   in a state  of   insurrection and   proceeding under 
cover of  the   insurrection which he  himself created   —   for  it had  no 
existence except upon  paper   in his   proclamation —  he  sent there an 
armed   force   on the day when  the people  had  assembled  together to hear 
those who aspired   to represent them in Congress discuss   the state of 
the United   States. .     , .,     „   . 
This  armed  force entered   that  peaceful  and orderly assembly and 
there without authority or  civil   officer of  the   law,  without  pretence 
that anybody had made  any affidavit,   without warrant upon which a man 
could  be deprived  of  his   liberty,   first  seized Doctor Roane,   one of  the 
most respectable  gentlemen   in the  state;   and  then   .   .   .   trie  snemi, 
the coroner  and  others   of   the  prominent  citizens   of  the  county, many of 
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them pillars  of   society,   both in church and  state and men above   reproach 
in every respect. 
When they asked, "By what authority?" the answer was, "Here is 
my authority." — referring to the men with bayonets in hand with oaths 
and  imprecations  disgraceful   to civilization.2 
The  prosecution took the   position  that  the Governor could not, 
under any circumstance,   order an arrest without a warrant.     Even  if 
parties were actually  in arms  as   insurgents  or  in insurrection,   the 
governor, when he  called  out  the militia,  might not  have  these men 
arrested without  a warrant.     If the militia saw parties   in the  act of 
violating  the   law,   it   had   the  same   right  to arrest  them that any citizen 
had.     The  prisoners must,   however,   be  turned over to the civil  authorities 
at once.     The   prosecution maintained  that even  if   the   privilege  of  the 
writ of  habeas  corpus   were   suspended   in time of   invasion or rebellion a 
warrant of  some  kind  was  necessary to authorize arrests. 
Furthermore,   the  prosecution continued,   the executive of the state 
had no power  to make   arrests.     In  the distribution of powers under the 
state  constitution,   the   legislative,  executive  and  judicial  departments 
each had  their  several  duties and   powers,   and  the  personal   liberty of  the 
citizen was   under  the  especial  care of   the   judiciary.     There was  no nec- 
essity which could  authorize  the executive  to  assume  the exercise of   judi- 
cial  power and  seize   the  persons  of citizens  by his own orders. 
It was maintained   by the   prosecution that the men arrested at 
Holden's  orders   had   been prominent and outstanding citizens of the  state, 
and  that  there  had   been no evidence  to   justify  their arrest.     It was 
*It  should  be   remembered   that   it was  brought out in evidence at 
the  trial   that many of these "respectable citizens" arrested at   Holden's 
order were active   leaders  of  the   Klan,   and had  participated  in the atro- 
cities of   that organization. 
2Holden,   Impeachment  Proceedings,  III,   2275-2276. 
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pointed  out  that no  piece of evidence   had been presented during the entire 
trial  against any of   the one  hundred   persons  arrested.     Kirk was  reported 
to have  said  to Judge   Kerr at  the  time of  his  arrest,   "I  have nothing 
against  you;   there  is   no evidence  against you,   I  should not have  arrested 
you,   but  I  was  directed  to do  it by the governor."3     in summarizing this 
argument,   Thomas   Bragg asked: 
Was   there  a charge against   them?    None except  that they were  prominent men 
and  belonged  to a different  political   party from that   of the  governor.   .   .   . 
the   respondent caused   the arrest  of  these gentlemen when he knew that there 
was   no evidence   against them.     Out of  his own wicked   heart  and   for wicked 
purposes,   he  had   them  seized  and detained and   imprisoned until   he was   forced 
to surrender  them.'* 
Furthermore,   the   prosecution maintained,   if  these men  had  been suspected, 
they could   have   been readily arrested  by process   from  a civil magistrate. 
As  this point   has  been discussed  earlier,   it  need  not  be considered  fur- 
ther  he re. 
The argument  used  by   llolden's defense was   that   the  declaration of 
a state of   insurrection and martial   law suspended  not  only  all  ordinary 
law,   but all   the   provisions   in the  state constitution and  bill of  rights 
which served   to  protect  the   lives,   liberties  and  property of  citizens. 
"If William Holden  had   legal  power and  authority  to declare  Alamance and 
Caswell   in  insurrection,   he  was   justified   in arresting,  without warrant 
all   suspected   persons   therein,   and of detaining   the same,  until  such time 
as the public  safety  permitted  their  surrender  to the  civil   authorities."5 
A number of authorities  were  cited   in  support  of this  point.     The 
Duke  of Wellington was   quoted as   having said  that martial   law was  no law 
3Ibid.,   2503. 
4Ibid.,   2502-2503. 
5Ibid.,   II,   1050. 
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at all.     It was  a denial of  a   law and could not  be subject to regulation. 
That meant a denial  of  all  civil   law,  and  in a  locality where  an  insur- 
rection  had  been declared  the  civil   law had  no   force or  effect.     In addition, 
the defense  pointed  out,   the state   Supreme Court  had decided  in the habeas 
corpus cases  of   1870  that  arrests might   lawfully be made of suspected 
persons  within  the   limits  of  insurrectionary counties.     The Chief Justice, 
who had  written the  opinion for  the unanimous  Court,   stated  that the effect 
of  the declaration of  insurrection  in Alamance  and Caswell   had  been to 
authorize   --   to  legalize   so to  speak --   the arrests of   suspected  persons 
without all   the constitutional   safeguards that were applicable under nor- 
mal  conditions. 
The defense   produced  no evidence  against   the men arrested  other 
than the  testimony  of a  few witnesses   that certain of   the "outstanding 
citizens"  of Alamance and Caswell  were  active  Klan members.     Because of 
the nature of   the Klan's crimes  it would have   been almost impossible  to 
find enough evidence  against any person to obtain a conviction in the 
civil  courts.     It was  brought out   in evidence   that Holden had been  in- 
formed  of  persons   in both counties  who were  active  in  the Klan crimes. 
The Governor ordered  Kirk to arrest them on probable cause  for crimes 
each of  them had committed.     It   is   not known who   informed  Holden,   nor 
how accurate  the  source was.     No doubt  some   innocent men were arrested, 
but  Holden maintained  that   this was  a necessary risk  if   the  Klan's 
depredations were   to be  stopped. 
I 
The  burden of Articles  V     and VI   -   the charge   that Governor 
Holden had  refused   to obey  the writs of  habeas   corpus   -  was  second only 
in importance   to the  charge  that he  had  declared  an unlawful   state  of 
insurrection in Alamance and Caswell.     The  real  point at  issue   here was 
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the authority of  the state executive  to  suspend   temporarily  the operations 
of  the regular civil courts.     Could   the writ of  habeas  corpus be  suspended 
for  the duration of   the   state  of  insurrection?    Could  the governor  over- 
rule the demands  of the civil  courts   temporarily?    These were  the   points 
to be argued. 
The   prosecution,   instead of analyzing these   issues,   devoted most 
of  its efforts   to a partisan narrative  of the facts,   apparently hoping 
to dramatize   the "magnitude of the  offense".     It was   pointed  out to   the 
Court that the original   Shoffner Bill   had  contained  a clause  authorizing 
the  state executive   to   call  upon the President  to suspend the  privilege 
of  the writ of   habeas   corpus.     The   legislature,   however,   had  voted  to 
exclude   such a provision  from  the  bill.     Holden's   next move,   the  prose- 
cution emphasized,   had  been to make  a direct appeal  to   the  North Carolina 
delegation in Congress.     Holden wrote: 
Gentlemen we want military tribunals  by which assassins and mur- 
derers   can be   summarily   tried  and shot,   but we  cannot  have   these  tribunals 
unless   the  president   is  authorized   to suspend  the  habeas  corpus   in certain 
localities.     Please  aid   in conferring  this   power on the   president as   the 
only effective mode  of  protecting  life and   property  in Alamance and   other 
localities  in the  state." 
Congress did  not grant  this application  if  indeed any were made.     Never- 
theless,   as W.   A.  Graham argued: 
Holden with full  knowledge of   the  positive   injunction in the Declaration 
of Rights,   .   .   .  and  that  the Congress  of  the United   States had failed 
to respond   to  his wishes,   and  in the absence of any pretence of authori- 
zation by the  president,  more  than three  months   later when  the county was 
in perfect tranquility,   undertook  himself,   by mere executive orders,   to 
make arrests,   to hold   his   prisoners  in defiance  of writ,  and  actually 
proceeded  to  appoint a military commission to try  them as prisoners  amen- 
able  to military   law. 
6Ibid.,   Ill,   2311-2312. 
7Ibid.,   2312. 
57 
Soon after   the  arrests   had been made,   the  state   Supreme Court 
issued   the prisoners writs of   habeas   corpus.     Chief Justice  Pearson had 
said   in his opinion for   the Court  in  the   habeas  corpus  cases   (1870)   that 
the writ had   not been suspended  and   could not be.     The Chief Justice 
served an order upon Holden to deliver  the  prisoners  before  him,   but 
Holden declined   to obey  the  order,   "pretending that he  was   justified by 
a portion of  his    [Pearson'sj   opinion in doing what  he did".8 
The prosecution maintained   that   Holden had  not   planned  to  turn 
the  prisoners  over   to a civil   judge,   but  that  he had arranged   to  try them 
before a military court.     It was  charged   that at  the  same  time   the Gov- 
ernor  had been assuring  Pearson that   he would  turn the   prisoners  over  to 
him as  soon as  conditions  allowed   it,   he  had  been arranging with Kirk 
for a military trial.     The charge  was made   that  Holden  through corres- 
pondence  had  arranged   for a military   trial   to  be  held  on July  25,   1870, 
but for some  unspecified   reason it  had  been postponed  until  after   the 
August election.     The   situation had  changed  so fast after the  election 
that  the trial  was   never   held. 
It was  pointed   out  that   the Chief Justice   in his opinion for  the 
habeas corpus  cases   --   a copy of which had  been sent to Holden --   had 
stated  that  the Governor had   no authority to   institute   a military com- 
mission to  try  the  prisoners;   that  he  had  no right   to  try any citizen 
by any other device   than by bringing  him before  the civil courts. 
The   prosecution concluded  by  invoking  the argumentum ad   horrendum. 
It   is   implied  (said W.   A.  GrahamJ   .   .   .   that  such of  them as   this 
military court  found guilty were  to suffer death by  hanging or shooting 
or such penalties   as   this wise military commission should  impose.     And 
then perhaps   it was   intended   to re-open the correspondence with the  chief- 
5Ibid.,   2506. 
justice,   by  advising  that the writs had  abated  by the death of   the 
applicants. 
There  was  some   disagreement among the members  of   the defense  con- 
cerning  this  charge.     Edward Conigland denied   that  it had  been Holden's 
purpose   to bring any prisoner  before a military court;10 but William 
Smith,   on  the  other  hand,   implied  that  although  the Governor had  planned 
such a  trial   he   had   fortunately   failed   to carry   it out.     Holden's auth- 
ority,   Smith said,   was   restricted   to the  arrest  and detention of   prisoners, 
until,   and  no   longer  than, they could  be   surrendered  to  the  courts.     "If 
William Holden  planned  a military court he made  a grave error.     But  since 
he did  not carry   it  out,   it cannot  be  held against him."11 
The defense   took  the   position that   the  declaration of martial   law 
had suspended   the  writ  of  habeas  corpus.     Nathaniel   Boyden told  the Court: 
Martial   law places at once every citizen under  the military power;   and  the 
judicial   power  of  the   state   has   no sort of  authority  in such  locality and 
neither   the  Chief  Justice nor any other  judge  has any  authority   to  issue 
a  precept  to run  into any  locality declared   in a state  of   insurrection.12 
The   purpose of   the  arrest of   suspected  persons,   the  defense argued, 
had not  been to bind  them over  for   trial;   it  had  not been so much to bring 
offenders   to  justice,   as   it had   been to  break up and  destroy Klan organi- 
zations which had   been  the  source of crime.     Holden had arrested  the men 
involved   because   the  safety  of   the state demanded  it.     It  had been his 
purpose   to detain them only until   such time  as   he might with safety  to the 
state   surrender   them to   the civil  authorities,  and as   soon as   in his   judg- 
9lbid.,   2281. 
10Ibid.,   II,   1077. 
uIbid. ,   III,   2396. 
12Ibid.,   2328. 
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ment such time   had  arrived,   he  had  surrendered   them.     Actually,   as  the 
prosecution made  clear,   Holden had  not   turned   the  prisoners  over to the 
civil  authorities   because  he  believed   the Klan menace   to be at an end. 
It was  rather  "a  forced obedience.   ...   He made a virtue of  necessity -- 
it was  not his  choice."13 
In   1870  there   were   few precedents except  British ones  to  justify 
William  Holden's   temporary  suspension of  the  operation of  the civil  courts, 
but  the defense made   full  use of  the   few that  were available.     The opinion 
written by  Pearson  for  the  habeas  corpus cases   (1870)  was   invoked as   justi- 
fication  for holding the  prisoners.     The  Chief  Justice  had upheld  Holden's 
right  to make  arrests,   and   the defense  argued   that  this carried with it 
the  right   to detain as   long as  was  necessary  to accomplish the  object  for 
which the  arrest was  made.     Pearson had,   in fact,   left his position ambig- 
uous,  and   it was   possible   for  both the defense   and   the  prosecution to use 
his opinion  in  support   of  their cases.   * 
The defense  also cited  President  Lincoln as   having said   in  1861: 
Soon after  the   first call   for militia   it was     necessary     ...   to 
suspend  the   privilege  of  the writ of   habeas  corpus.   .   .   .  The  whole  of 
the   laws which were   required   to  be  faithfully executed were being  resisted 
...   in nearly  one-third of   the  states.     -- Are  all   the   laws  but one  to 
go unexecuted and   the   government  itself  to go to pieces   lest   that one 
should  be  violated?1^ 
While   the   bill   legalizing Lincoln's  actions was  being debated   in the 
Senate,  Senator   Sherman had   said: 
13 Ibid.,   2514. 
14Nathaniel   Boyden   later  told  Holden,   however,   that Pearson had 
confided   to him during  the   trial   that   the Governor  had  the right   to  sus- 
pend the writ of   habeas corpus.     Holden,   Memoirs,   151. 
15IIolden,   Impeachment  Proceedings,   III,   2372. 
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Lincoln did not  act  lawfully   in suspending the writ  of habeas  cor- 
pus  for  the Congress of  the United  States alone   is competent  to do  this-" 
Yet  I would have done   the   same  thing.     His  justification must  be  found   in 
the exigencies  of  the  hour,  and   the   perils   of  the nation.16 
The defense   insisted that  the condition which existed   in Alamance and Cas- 
well   in  1870 had demanded  that  Holden  take  the   same drastic   action that 
Lincoln had  taken nine  years  earlier. 
Perhaps  the  most   important  precedent cited  by the defense was  that 
of ex parte Milligan  (1866),   in which the   Supreme Court  had held that the 
writ should  have   been  issued  because   the  courts   in Indiana had  been open. 
Nevertheless,   Chief Justice Chase added  obiter dictum: 
Those courts might be open. . . . and unrestrictive in the execution of 
their functions, and yet wholly incompetent to avert threatened danger or 
to pusish with adequate promptitude and certainty the guilty conspirators 
-- In Indiana, the judges and officers were loyal to the government. But 
it might have been otherwise. In times of rebellion and civil war, it 
may often happen indeed, that judges and marshal Is will be in active sym- 
pathy with the  rebels,   and  the  courts   their most efficient allies.17 
Such had   been the   situation  in Alamance  and Caswell   in  1870,   the defense 
maintained,   and the  courts   in both counties  had  been so effectually con- 
trolled  by Klansmen or  Klan sympathizers   that  not a single violation of 
the   law by the  Klan had ever been punished   in either  county. 
Unfortunately  for   Holden,   his   former Confederate   jurors were not 
impressed  by  Lincoln's   rationalization for  suspending   the writ,  and   the 
private  opinion of  Senator Sherman was,   of course,  not established   law. 
Instead of accepting the  defense's   interpretation of ex  parte  Milligan 
(1866),   the  prosecution,   on the contrary,  construed the   case   to prove 
that Holden had not had  the  right  to suspend the writ. 
16 Ibid. 
I 7 Ibid.,   2324-2325. 
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Today  there  are  a  number of   precedents  which sustain the  right   of 
a governor   to   ignore,   for  the   time   being,   the  orders  of  the courts,   and 
history has  vindicated  Holden on this point,   though the vindication came 
too late  to afford  him much  gratification. 
<* 
The   partisan nature  of   the   trial  was nowhere more  apparent than 
in the  proceedings  relating to the  charge   that  Holden had ordered  the 
arrest of Josiah Turner,   Jr.,   outside  the   two  insurrectionary counties. 
The Governor's  conviction by a majority of one   was  based upon the question- 
able evidence   of  three witnesses   --   Josiah Turner,   Senator  John Graham, 
and John W.   Gorman.     No order  for  the arrest was  presented  as evidence. 
Turner  testified   that  Lieutenant  Hunnicutt,   the arresting officer, 
had  told him  that  he  was  being  arrested  by  the   order  of Governor   Holden. 
Senator John Graham,   who had been present  when Turner was  arrested,   told 
the Court: 
I   .    .    .   asked  the   lieutenant   [Hunnicutt^    ...   to state what 
authority he  had  for Mr.   Turner's  arrest.     He said  that he was  arrested 
by the  order of Governor   Holden,  and he  said  further,   'If  you have  come 
here about any writs  of  habeas  corpus   1  have an order to arrest you'. 
Graham went  on  to  testify  that he   saw the  order   for  Turner's  arrest,  and 
that the arresting officer  had  received his orders  from Lt.   Colonel  George 
Burgen,   the   second  in command,   who had secured   them  from Holden.     A third 
witness, John W.   Gorman,   testified   that  on the  day of the election he had 
gone  to the  courthouse   to vote and met  Holden there   talking  to a friend. 
Since  he could  not vote at  that  time, Gorman stopped  and   listened  to Hol- 
den's conversation.     "In the  conversation,"    Gorman said,   "I   heard  him say 
he either would as   soon as   he   left   there  or he had already  ordered 
18 Ibid.,   I,   916. 
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the arrest of Mr.   Turner.     It  is my impression he   said  he would when he 
left." Such was   the evidence upon which  the   senate convicted   Holden. 
Turner and   his  newspaper  had been violent critics of   the   Holden 
administration and  the  prosecution maintained  that  the Governor had  ordered 
the arrest of Turner to gratify a private  grudge.     The argument was   that 
it was   a new law of   libel when a newspaper editor  could be arrested  and 
severely dealt with for a criticism or denunciation of a man in authority. 
Actually Holden and  Turner had   been political enemies   for several 
years.     When Turner was  asked during his  cross-examination what  his   per- 
sonal   feelings  were  toward   the Governor,   he replied that  "they are   just 
as   they ought  to be  between a good and a bad man."20    Governor Holden 
then rose   from his  seat and   informed  the Court  that  he would  not  submit 
to such  language.     When  the witness  repeated   his  statement  Holden rose 
again and  in anger shook his   fist  at Turner.     Nathaniel   Boyden,   a member 
of   his  counsel,  caught  the Governor  by  the coattail,   but could   not  pull 
him back into his  seat.     Senator   Edwards demanded  that  the Governor be 
made  to  behave   himself  in Court.     Holden,   refusing to  submit  to Turner's 
abuse,   asked  for  permission to   leave  the chamber.     A few days   later  Tur- 
ner wrote  that when  Holden "left   the  Senate Chamber breathing wrath against 
us we  received  a note,   informing us   that Governor   Holden said  we ought  to 
be   'stomped' ."2^- 
Turner finally admitted  to the Court  that  bitter  feelings  had 
existed  between the  Governor  and  himself   for about  twenty years,  and   that 
19lbid., 919. 
20Ibid., 906. 
21The Raleigh Sentinel ,   February 20,   1871. 
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he  had  never  spoken a dozen words   to  Holden.     In his  Memoirs   Holden said 
that  this   last  statement was  untrue: 
Mr.   Turner when in Raleigh during  his canvassing for the Confederate  Con- 
gress,   talked with me  for some   time  and  he and  I  adjourned   to a restaurant 
and  took a drink  together.   ...  My paper,   the   Standard was  for him for 
Congress and  really elected  him over  his  opponent.22 
The  argument of  the defense was   that Governor  Holden,   far from 
ordering the arrest of Turner outside  the counties under martial   law, 
had  given specific verbal  orders   to  the militia officers  not  to  arrest 
Turner outside  those  two counties.     The  arrest   had been made  contrary 
to  Holden's   orders  and without  his  advice,   knowledge or consent. 
The Governor  had,   on the other hand,   given a verbal  order  to   have 
Turner arrested   if he were  found   in either Alamance or Caswell  county on 
the ground   that  Turner   had  been instrumental   in inciting a  state of civil 
war  in  the  two  insurrectionary  counties.     In his reply to   the  impeachment 
charge   Holden averred  that he   had  good reason  to believe  that Turner was 
a member of   the  Klan,   and an instigator of  the  outrages which had  been 
committed   in Alamance and Caswell."    By his writings   in the Sentinel,  as 
well  as  by his  public  speeches   in various  parts   of the state,  and  by a 
continued course of agitation which   he  pursued,   Turner  had  contributed 
largely  to  the deplorable state  of affairs  which existed   there.     Further- 
more,   Holden charged,   Turner  had  worked  to bring about a collision between 
the militia and  the citizens   in Alamance and Caswell,   and had  tried  to 
incite   the  citizens   to eject  the militia by force.     He  had  also attempted 
22Holden,   Memoirs,   166. 
23it  cannot be   proved  whether or not Turner belonged  to the  Klan; 
however,   there   is  no question  that  he was at   least a  Klan sympathizer. 
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to induce the people In other parts of the state to enter the two counties 
under martial   law and  drive  the militia out  by  force. 
Both  Holden and his defense  protested   that Turner had actually 
attempted  to  bring about his own arrest by frequently challenging and 
defying  the Governor   to do so.     They maintained  that Turner  had  been 
anxious   to be arrested   in order to advance   his   own political   prospects 
and patronage  as  an editor.     If he could  provoke Holden to arrest him, 
the   Sentinel  could  condemn the Governor  as  a  tyrant. 
Certainly,   as   the  defense declared,   there was   not  sufficient evi- 
dence  to  justify  Holden's conviction.     The   arrest might  have  been ordered 
by Lt.   Colonel   Burgen,   who  had given Lieutenant Hunnicutt an order  signed 
by himself rather  than by  the Governor.     If  so,   this  would discredit   the 
testimonies of  both Turner  and  Senator Graham.     If John Gorman had  not 
heard enough of  Holden's conversation  to  know when the Governor was 
planning to order  the  arrest,   he might also have   failed  to hear   the Gov- 
ernor  say that he was  going to  order  the  arrest  only   if  Turner went   into 
either  Alamance or Caswell.     Also,   it must  be   remembered,   these   three 
witnesses were  all   political enemies   of  the  Governor. 
Whether or not  Holden ordered   the  arrest of Josiah Turner remains 
uncertain.     Most historians who have  written about  Holden,   however,   have 
assumed   that  he  gave   such an order.     J.  G.   de  R.   Hamilton wrote  that Colonel 
C.   L.   Harris  --   Superintendent of public works   in 1870 --   told him in  1906 
that he   heard on the morning of August  5,   1870,   that  the  order  had been 
given to arrest Turner,  and although he  and  Holden had not   spoken for a 
year,   he went at  once   to   the Governor's  office  and  asked  if   it were   true. 
Holden replied,   "It   is  none of your d—d  business  but I  have ordered   it."2** 
2**Reconstruction  in North Carolina     (New York:     Columbia University 
Press,   1914),   p.   524. 
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The  prosecution retorted   that even  if   Holden had  not ordered  Tur- 
ner's  arrest,   he  had   sanctioned   it  by authorizing his detention.     "That 
makes   him  just as  responsible  as   if  he  had ordered   the  arrest or  had ad- 
mitted   he had ordered   it."2^ 
There  was  no  question that  Holden ordered  Turner's detention,   for 
the Governor   said,   in  his   reply  to the charge,   that  he  had  given such an 
order.     The defense  argued  that Turner's detention was   justified even 
though he  had   been arrested  in Orange County because  the military move- 
ment was  on a   large   scale,   and contemplated   the overthrow and   breaking 
up of   an organization of  great strength,  extending over many counties. 
In such circumstances   there would  be occasional   irregularities  and ex- 
cesses   which might  perhaps   have  been avoided,   but were  incidental   to 
such enterprises.     If  the dispersion of   the   illegal   Klan and  the  rein- 
stating of  law over a  large area  from which it  had   been expelled,   were 
objects   of   the military operations,   the wrongful  arrest of a  single per- 
son should not  require an  impeachment when   the grand military movement 
itself   stood   approved. 
The absurdity of the charge was expressed by Nathaniel Boyden 
in his closing argument, which supplied the one humerous event of the 
entire   trial.     Said   he,   with tongue   in cheek: 
-  -  -   Josiah Turner,   Jr.,   .   .   .   labored  for months   to  have   himself arrested 
by  the   respondent,   and   ...   at   last succeeded.     He  went out of his way 
during  his examination     three   times   to prove   that  he was  a pious  and  holy 
man,   and   that  the  respondent was   a vile  sinner!   --  and  held  himself as  a 
man whose example was  to be  followed by all   good men!     Sir,  everybody knows 
that  Mr.   Turner was   this   sort of  a man,  and   he  need not  have  gone  out of 
his way  to prove what  a  holy and virtuous man he  was.     Every man who has 
read  the   Sentinel   since  he  became  its editor  knew that  he was  a shining 
example  of  the  beauty of   holiness  and   that he  had   consecrated   his   talents 
25Holden,   Impeachment  Proceedings,   III,   2496. 
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and  his energies   to elevating the   character  of our   judiciary and  all  our 
state  officers 1     He knew the   importance  of  his  powers   in this regard,   and 
I am glad   that these military men,   with all   their faults,   had an eye   to 
"the  eternal   fitness  of  things."     They found   in the  prison   ...   a poor 
wretch condemned   to death,  who needed ghostly advice,   and  instead of 
sending  the cursing parson -- Yates   —   ...   they sent  this   good,   pious, 
and  holy and meek man,   Josiah Turner,   Jr.     (laughter)   to perform that 
spiritual   office,   and  1  am surprised  that  he   is not  grateful  for  having 
accorded   to  him that exalted  privilege.      (laughter)    Wouldn't it  be  a 
farce  for  grave  senators   to   try the Governor  for doing to  Turner  of all 
things  earthly what Turner most desired   (laughter)?26 
26 Ibid.,   2362-2363. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE  MINOR  CHARGES 
The   House  of Representatives   included   in  the Articles  of  Impeach- 
ment  a number of charges which were  not serious enough to   justify   impeach- 
ment,   but which gave  added weight   to  the more   important charges discussed 
in the   two previous chapters.     Governor  Holden was charged  with having 
employed an unlawful  army of  "desperate" men  in Alamance and Caswell. 
Furthermore,   he   had allowed maltreatment of  the   prisoners   arrested  by 
this  band;   he  had  issued  an unlawful   warrant to draw money  from the state 
treasury to  support this army;   and   he had evaded  a court order  forbidding 
him to disburse   the  funds.     The  defense,   as a   last resort,   advanced  the 
argument that even if   Holden had  committed   the  acts  as  charged,  he  could 
not be   removed  from office  because  there was  no unlawful   intent on  his 
part. 
2 
Article VII  charged   that  the military  force used  in  the  counties 
of  Alamance  and Caswell was  not a   lawful  state militia.     The  argument of 
the  prosecution was  essentially  that  both the Constitution and   laws  of  the 
state  of North Carolina,   as well  as   the Constitution of the  United  States, 
showed   Kirk's  "army"1   to have been an unlawful   force.     The   requirements 
for  the militia,   as  set  forth in the   state  constitution,  were  that  "all 
able-bodied  male  citizens  of  the   State of   North Carolina,   between the 
ilhe  prosecution never  referred  to the military force as  a militia. 
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ages  of twenty-one and  forty years,  who are citizens  of the United   States, 
shall  be   liable  to duty  in the militia.   .   .   ."2     On the  supposition that 
this  provision  laid down  the qualifications of  those who could  lawfully 
serve   in the militia,   the  prosecution proceeded  to prove  that many of 
Kirk's men had  not met its   specifications.     The muster rolls  of   the  regi- 
ment,   which were  introduced  as evidence,   showed  that out of  the entire 
force  of  670 men,   399 were  under twenty-one years  of  age  —   some as  young 
as  thirteen;   sixty-four were over the age of   forty;   over two  hundred came 
from other  states,   nearly all  of these from east Tennessee,  with a  few 
from Virginia and South Carolina;   and all   the  field officers,   including 
Kirk,   were east Tennesseeans. 
The   Militia Act of   1868 was  also appealed   to for proof  that  Kirk's 
regiment  had   been unlawfully organized.     The Act,   it was  affirmed,   re- 
quired   in  Section eleven that  "no man shall  be an officer or  private  in 
the detailed militia,   unless  he  be an elector  of   the   state   .   .   .   . ,   " 
and  as  a twelve-month  residence was  necessary to be a voter,   the appoint- 
ment by  Holden of officers   from Tennessee  had  been  illegal.     Furthermore, 
the  same  act  stated   in Section seven,   that  "the white  and colored men in 
the militia  shall  be  enrolled  in separate  and distinct  companies,   and 
shall   never be compelled  to serve   in the  same  companies."     In spite of 
this   provision,   the  prosecution protested,   Holden enrolled   Negro and 
white   troops   in the   same  regiment.     Kirk's  regiment,   it was argued,   was 
therefore  not  a part of   the   state militia,   but rather  an armed band  of 
"foreign mercenaries".     "It was a regular standing force,"     said Thomas 
Bragg,   "gotten up as  any other army  is  gotten up,   the  officers  and men 
all   sworn,  which is not  required  by   law in the militia."3    The handbill 
2Article   12,   Section  1. 
3Holden,   Impeachment  Proceedings,   III,   2482. 
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which Holden drew up for Kirk for use   in recruiting troops  read:     "Rally 
Union men.     Your old  commander has  been commissioned  to raise at once a 
regiment of  state  troops."    The   prosecution maintained   that   it was  signifi- 
cant that the  bill  read  "state   troops"   instead  of  "state militia",   and 
that  Kirk's men all   signed  similar articles   to those  prescribed for  sol- 
diers  in the regular army of   the  United  States,  with the substitution of 
"North Carolina"   for  "United   States".     "They were  called   'North Carolina 
State  Troops',"    W.  A.  Graham noted,   "their officers  always  signing  their 
orders or communications with an appendix of   'N.   C.   S.   T.',   until   Kirk was 
forced  by Judge   Brooks   to  sign his  returns   to  the writs  as   'Colonel  of   the 
Detailed Militia of  North Carolina'."^    These  troops also received  the  same 
pay as  United   States  regulars,   and the  reason no  commission was  produced 
by the defense   for  Kirk or any of his   officers,   a member of  the prosecution 
argued,   was   probably  "because   the  documents  would  have  shown that they 
were not commissioned   in the militia,  but in a regular  army raised   by the 
respondent   ...   in disregard  and defiance  both of the Constitution of  the 
state and of   the  national  government."5     In the matters  of required  age, 
citizenship,   and mode  of  enlistment  these  forces   had   no pretension to the 
character of   North Carolina militia. 
In conclusion,   the  prosecution contended   that Kirk's  regiment  had 
been formed and armed   in express violation of a clause   in the Constitution 
of  the United   States which provides   that  "No  State  shall,  without the  con- 
sent of  Congress,   .   .   .   keep  troops,   or  ships  of war  in time   of  peace   .   .   . 
^Ibid.,   2306. 
Because of a printing mistake  there  are   two pages  by this  number. 
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„6 unless  actually  invaded.   .   .   .' 
The defense  based   its   rebuttal  upon the  Militia Act of   1868 which 
specified,   in Section eight: 
The  governor   is  hereby authorized   to accept and  organize  regiments of 
volunteer infantry,   not exceeding  six.   .   .   .   If  in the discretion of 
the  governor,   it  shall   be deemed advisable,  he may also accept and 
organize volunteer  battalions  or cavalry,   not  to exceed  three,   and one 
volunteer  battery of artillery.   .   .   J 
This  act,   in the  defense's  view,   gave express  authority to Governor Hal- 
den to use  regiments   of volunteer   infantry  to  a number exceeding  those 
actually used.     What  type  of military force  —   regular or volunteer militia 
--  was  best  suited   for  the  repression of violence was necessarily  left   to 
the   judgment of  the  governor;   and  he,   in  turn,   believed  the volunteer 
force   the most available  and best  adapted  to the desired end. 
As   for   the   limitations  respecting age,   citizenship, mode  of en- 
listment,  and race,   the  defense argued  that  they pertained  only  to co- 
erced  involuntary service.     These   limitations,   it was maintained,  did  not 
apply,   and were  not   intended   to apply to persons who had  volunteered  and 
were willing to  serve.     As William  Smith said   in summary: 
Whether  the   troops enlisted  under  Kirk were within or without  the con- 
stitutional   age,   whether they were   from Tennessee or  North Carolina, 
wherever they may  have  come,   when accepted  by William Holden they became 
and were part of   the mixitia and could  be used   for  any  legitimate and 
proper  service for which any other  class  of   the militia could be used.8 
The   law commanded   that  persons  of   two races  "shall  never  be compelled 
^Article  I,   Section 10. 
7Holden,   Impeachment Proceedings,  III,   2409. 
Slbid.,   2410. 
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to  serve   in the  same  companies,"  but  their voluntary association in a 
single   company was  nowhere  prohibited.     Furthermore,   declared  the defense, 
evidence   showed  that  the  Negroes  were employed   as  teamsters,  cooks,   and 
in other menial  offices,   and  there was   little  genuine   intermixing.     All 
this,   the   defense  held,   proved   that  the regiment had  been duly organized 
and accepted,   and   its  officers   had  been commissioned,   according to  law. 
3 
In Articles   I   and VII  Governor  Holden was accused of having em- 
ployed  an armed  band  of "lawless and desperate men",   and with maltreat- 
ment of   the prisoners.     In support of this charge,   the prosecution sub- 
mitted   that  there   had  been violent  arrests  by   rude  soldiers without any 
semblance  of   legal  warrant;   bail  had  been refused;   the writ of habeas 
corpus   had been defied;   there   had  been continued confinement of prisoners, 
torture  by imprisonment and  threats  of speedy death of the   prisoners and 
their women and  children as  well.     In some cases their dwellings   had been 
burned,   and,  even after writs   had  been issued,   a number of  the  prisoners 
were  thrust "into  the common  jail   amid filth and vermin,   as  if to con- 
summate   the  last act of revenge and degradation before the victims  are 
wrested out of his Cnolden's3 hands."9 
To prove   that Colonel   Kirk and   his men were   "lawless" and  "utterly 
without  character",   the  prosecution presented   the  testimony of a number 
of  the men arrested  at   Holden's order.     Witnesses described  how they had 
been cursed,   threatened with death,   and   hanged  until   they were unconscious. 
Josiah Turner claimed   to  have  been  insulted and tortured by  having rocks 
thrown into  his cell,   by having water poured  on his  bed,   and by having 
his  soap stolen by the militia. 
*Ibid.,   2285. 
■ 
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Both Kirk and  Lieutenant Colonel  George  Burgen were depicted  by 
the prosecution as   ruthless   leaders.     Unfortunately for  Itolden,   the charges 
made  against  Burgen seem to  have carried  a   large measure  of truth.     Even 
Holden's defense  admitted  that   Burgen had  black-mailed  prisoners,   freed 
them for money,   and  hanged  others   —  a familiar practice  of   the  Klan --   to 
extort  confessions.     Three witnesses   --  Lucien Murray,  William Patton,  and 
George   Rogers   —   testified   that   they had  been tortured  and  intimidated by 
Burgen to force  them to  reveal   information concerning  the  Klan.     While   Bur- 
gen made  some  serious   threats,   he did  not   actually carry out any  of  them. 
Apparently,   as  the   following testimony of  Lucien Murray   indicates,   he hoped 
to frighten a confession  from the  prisoners. 
Burgen asked me   [said  Murray]   about  the   Klan and   I   answered:     "I  don't know 
anything about  them.     Burgen replied:     "None   of your d—d   lies.     Then he 
got up and   taking his  pistol  he  put   it at my  breast and  the  other  three men 
did  the  same.     Four  pistols were  presented  at my breast  and  cocked,   and  he 
told me  that  they would  "blow my d--d  heart out   if   I  didn't   tell."     Finally 
he carried me  to a tree with a rope around my neck and  drew me up.     How  long 
he held me  there   I   don't  know,   but  I   soon became  unconscious.     On being   let 
down,   I  was  unable   to stand and  could not speak or anything else.     When I 
came   to and  still   would not confess  Burgen said  to  the   sergeant:     "Hang 
him on that   limb until   8  o'clock tomorrow morning,   and   then cut him down 
and  bury him under  the   tree.   ..."     Burgen did  not carry out  the   threat 
but sent me  back to the  sergeant's  quarters with  the  threat  that:     "I  will 
give you till   ten o'clock tomorrow to make  your confession;   if you don't 
give  it by  that  time I will   take you  out and  kill   you dead. ..10 
The  defense  denied  that Holden could  be  held responsible   for 
Burgen's  actions,   performed   in disregard  of his   instructions.     All   that 
could  be   legally demanded  of   the Governor,   the  defense maintained,  was 
that he select suitable  and competent officers;   that he  prescribe  nec- 
essary rules and   instructions   for  their  guidance;   and  that he   interpose 
when advised of misconduct  by an officer.     It was  noted  that Holden had 
10Ibid. ,   I,   662. 
73 
given his  officers  specific directions   to afford  ample  protection to   the 
lives and  property of  the  prisoners.     If any prisoner  had  been mistreated, 
it  had been done  contrary  to the Governor's orders  and without  his consent. 
When Holden had   heard  of  Burgen's   actions  he  had  promptly  intervened   to 
prevent  their recurrence.     The   partisan Court,   however,   refused  to  allow 
the defense   to present evidence  showing that   Holden had  attempted  to 
arrest and  punish Burgen  for his unlawful conduct.     While  testimony could 
not  be  introduced,   the defense  continued   to argue   that Governor  Holden  had 
never sanctioned  a single act  of outrage  on the  part of any of his  subor- 
dinate officers.     If  Burgen were  guilty,   he was   to be  tried as  any criminal 
would be,   but,  as William  Smith concluded:     "It would be a monstrous doc- 
trine   ...   to  hold the  supreme executive officer of a  state  chargeable 
personally with  the misconduct of all  those whom he appoints   and  commissions 
to  perform public trusts."11 
The only concrete evidence   presented  to  prove   that Kirk was   a  "des- 
perate"  and  "lawless" man,  was  that he  had made  a single  threat  that  if 
he were  attacked   in Yanceyville,   he would  kill   all   the  prisoners  and des- 
troy the  town with  the women and   children  in  it.     The  reputation Kirk had 
made  for   himself as  a Union guerrilla was,   however,  enough to  satisfy  the 
Court  that  the  charge was  true. 
The defense went   to the  opposite extreme  and described   the Colonel 
as   "brave   in battle and  gentle  in peace."12     It was asserted   that   in Ala- 
mance and Caswell   Kirk had acted  with prudence  and discretion,  except  for 
one   threat,  which was  merely uttered  in a moment  of excitement.     It was 
UIbid.,   Ill,   2417. 
12ibid.,   2415. 
■ 
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made  obviously   for no other  object  than to overawe  and   prevent an uprising 
among the  prisoners,   and   he made   no demonstration of a serious  purpose   to 
execute  the  threat. 
The defense   granted  that   the measures   taken by  the militia had   not 
been the most desirable,   but   it was countered   that extreme measures were 
required  to put down the   lawless  situation which had existed   in Alamance 
and  Caswell.     The  Klan,   the  defense maintained,   could  never  have  been 
broken up by the regular and peaceful   remedies  of  the   law. 
Actually the  situation was  not nearly so bad as  the Conservatives 
maintained,   for none  of  the  prisoners  suffered more  than temporary dis- 
comfort.     When  the  depredations  of Kirk's   troops   are compared with those 
of   the  Klan they appear mild.     Nevertheless   the  prosecution and  the Con- 
servative  press  of  Josiah Turner  continued  to maintain  that   "such bar- 
barity and cruelty was  never  known before  on this  continent.     J     "One 
wonders,"     as  one  historian concluded,   "how  the whole  episode could have 
been so  successfully dramatized  so soon after  the   termination of   the  real 
war,  when actual  physical  and mental   suffering were  not mere   fictions  of 
the  imagination." 
4 
Article VII  also charged   that Governor  Holden by his  illegal  war- 
rant  had caused   large  sums  of public money  to be   drawn  from the   state   trea- 
sury to  sustain his  unlawful military force.     This charge   rested  upon  the 
contention that Kirk's   regiment had been an unlawful   force,   for  the  Shoff- 
ner Act  had   given the Governor  the authority to use  public   funds   to main- 
tain a   lawful  militia. 
13The  Raleigh  Sentinel,   February  14,   1871. 
14Ewing,   219. 
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The defense,   as has  already been  shown,  maintained that   the   force 
was  a  lawful   state militia,   and   that the Governor was required   by the 
Shoffner Act  to draw from the  treasury  such funds  as  were  necessary   for 
paying  the  troops.     The  prosecution,  on the other hand,   insisted   that 
since   it had  already  been proved   that  Kirk's  regiment  had   been an illegal 
force,   it  followed  that neither  the state  constitution nor the   Shoffner 
Act had   given the Governor  the   authority to draw funds  from the  state 
treasury  to  support  a military  force which  they  prohibited him  from  forming. 
Article VIII   involved a  somewhat  related,   but more  involved  charge. 
After Holden had appointed  A.   D.   Jenkins,   the  Paymaster,   to draw a  large 
sum of money   from the   state  treasury to   sustain the militia,   an  injunction 
was  obtained   by  Holden's  political enemies   from Anderson  Mitchell,   the 
superior  court  judge,   for   the  tenth district,   to prevent   the  disbursement 
of  the  money.     Article VIII charged that Holden sought  to evade   the   force 
and effect  of   the   injunction,   and   to that  end  removed Jenkins   from his 
place  as  Paymaster,   appointed John B.   Neathery   in his place,  and arranged 
to turn over   the money  to him to be disbursed.     In this  way,   it was  charged, 
the Governor evaded  the  purpose   of  the  writ of  injunction. 
This was   the   second charge accusing Holden of refusing   to obey a 
court   order.     The   basic question seems   to have  been whether or not  a state 
judge   had the  authority to  issue an injunction ordering  that   funds   not be 
drawn  from the   treasury to support  the militia,   or,   from the   point  of 
view of  the   prosecution,   whether he  had  the authority to   issue   such an 
order,   even  though the military force  was  unlawful.     The  prosecution,  as 
usual   evaded  the  central   issue.     They accepted  the   proposition  that  the 
judge  had such authority,   and  assumed  that   if  it could  be proved that 
Holden did not obey  the   injunction,   he  must  be   found guilty.     "The main 
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point   involved   here," said Thomas   Bragg,   "is whether he  did   the acts 
charged and  did  thus disregard this injunction which,   as chief executive 
officer of   the   state,   it was  his  duty to   respect,   and   if  necessary   to be 
enforced."   5 
The   prosectuion once  again devoted   its efforts   to a partisan nar- 
rative  of  the   facts  of  the case.     Soon after  Kirk went   into Alamance and 
Caswell,   the  prosecution alleged,   some  $60,000 or more was drawn from  the 
treasury at  one  time  to sustain the  force.     It was charged  that there was 
no need  for  this money at  that time,   but  that  the Governor,   suspecting 
that  someone might attempt to stop him from using public  money  for  un- 
lawful  purposes,  drew the money out before   that could happen.     After a 
court   injunction had been issued  against Jenkins,   to prevent  the dis- 
bursement  of  these   funds,  or   the   paying of more money,   Holden set  out  to 
adopt  some  means of evading  the   injunction order.     The Governor  replaced 
Jenkins with Neathery  and  ordered him to give   the money to  his  successor. 
Jenkins was  doubtful  as   to whether he  ought  to   transfer  the money 
to   Neathery,   but  the Governor,   after much persuasion,   convinced him that 
he  could  safely  turn over  the  funds without  disobeying the   injunction. 
The  Governor  remarked   in Jenkins'   presence   that  it was  necessary  to have 
the money at  once  because  there might be  another   injunction obtained  to 
stop the money  in the  banks  where   it was  deposited.     Holden was  so anxious 
to obtain  the money that Jenkins went  to the bank at  once,   even though  it 
was   Sunday evening,   and,   by  personal   application  to one  of   the  bank offi- 
cers,   withdrew the  funds.     They were  turned   over  to the  new paymaster and 
disbursed  at once. 
The defense  took the  position that   the Governor was  not   subject 
15Holden,   Impeachment Proceedings,   III,   2518. 
77 
to   the   judicial   fiats  of  the   judges,   and  that  the   judiciary possessed  no 
power  to   issue  such an injunction against  Holden.     In fact,   so ran the 
argument,   the   injunction had   not been against  Holden himself but  against 
a subordinate  officer —  an appointee of  his,   but  not an officer  for whose 
conduct  he was   responsible. 
Since   Holden had a right under  North Carolina laws   to call  out 
troops,   he had  a right  to provide   for   their   payment;   and  his  right   to 
pay these  troops did not depend  upon whether or  not an injunction was 
issued,   but upon his  own authority,   independent of  the injunction,   to 
draw his warrant and make   the payment. 
5 
A final argument used  by Holden's defense was  that a public  official 
could   not be   held  responsible  for an unlawful  action done   in the   line of 
duty unless  an evil   intent were  present.     The defense argued  that  the  im- 
peachment court must   inquire  into the   conduct of   the Governor,   for   such 
was  a  rule applicable   in all   cases of   impeachment of  public  officers.     The 
Senate  could   not depose  an executive   from office merely because  he  had 
assumed  and used powers not delegated   to him.     Instead  the Court must ask 
if his motive were  an honest effort to discharge  his official   responsi- 
bilities,  and execute   in good  faith his  public   trusts.     Did  he  act   for the 
protection of  the  civil   rights  and for  the  preservation of  the   liberties 
of the   people  of the state?    If  so,   he  could  not be removed   from office. 
"To constitute an offense  punishable  by indictment,   in the case of any 
and all   civil  officers,"    William Smith argued,"it  is necessary  to charge, 
and  in the  trial   to  show a corrupt purpose  accompanying  the act,   or a party 
cannot  be  convicted." 
16Ibid.,   2374. 
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Among other  authorities cited  in support of  this  argument was 
Wharton's American Constitutional   Law,   which  said: 
It is  generally necessary  to constitute   the  offense   .   .   .   that  the 
motive  should  be corrupt.     In an  indictment  against an officer of  justice 
for misbehavior  in office,   it  is  necessary that an act  imputed as misbe- 
havior be distinctly and  substantially charged   to have  been done with 
corrupt,   partial, malicious   or   improper motives;   and  above  all,   with   know- 
ledge  that it was wrong.   .   .    .     ' 
The principle of official responsibility, the defense held, was 
decided in the state of North Carolina in the case of State v. Zachary. 
In his opinion Judge   Nash said: 
Does the giving the judgment in the absence of the parties and without their 
knowledge, in itself constitute corruption? Certainly not; because it might 
have  been in good  faith;   and   if  so,   an  indictment  cannot  be  supported.18 
These  authorities established,   it was maintained,   the  principle  that 
official   misconduct necessarity  involved corruption.     There must be   the 
corrupt  intent  —   there must be  a guilty purpose. 
The   defense  therefore  reasoned   that  if Governor   Holden really 
believed,  when he  issued  the  proclamations declaring Alamance  and Cas- 
well   in a  state  of   insurrection,   that   life  and   property were  not  safe, 
and   that  the civil  authority was  unable  to  protect  both,   he could  not 
be  deposed  from his office.     The  subjective  nature  of such an approach 
put  the defense at a disadvantage.     It could  not  have expected  a court 
that  refused  to accept concrete evidence  of   Holden's   innocence   to be 
impressed by efforts   to establish his   good   intentions. 
Rejecting the   proposition that  the Governor had  to be proved  guilty 
of criminal   intent,   the  prosecution declared   that  such a rule did not 
17Ibid. 
!8ibid.,   2375. 
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apply to executive  officers,   certainly not  to the extent claimed  by the 
defense.     Such an argument was  considered   to be  an admission that  Holden 
had  no   law upon which to   stand.     "Any  such plea as  that,"     said  Thomas 
Bragg,   "is  a  thing  that addresses   itself to your clemency,  and  not your 
justice."19 
Besides,   the  prosecution maintained,   the   facts of   the  case  proved 
absolutely  that Holden   possessed  a guilty   intent,  especially  in view of 
the   fact  that  the Governor   had  spent   the  greater part of   his   life   studying 
legal and constitutional  questions,  and was   therefore well  aware  of  the 
illegality of  his  actions. 
19Ibid.,   2474. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE  END OF  THE  TRIAL,   AND  HOLDEN'S  LATER  CAREER 
On March 21,   1871,   the  arguments were concluded  and  the Court 
agreed   to vote upon the Articles of   Impeachment  the  following day.     In 
the meanwhile  a number of  prominent  citizens   from different  sections of 
the  state  had come   to Raleigh to witness  the final  act of the  drama.     When 
the  Court convened   in  the   Senate chamber on the  following day at   11:00 
A.   M.   the  galleries  and   lobbies  were   thronged with  interested   spectators. 
The   House of Representatives  and   the   Board  of Managers were also  present 
in the   hall.     A two-thirds  vote of   the Senators  present  was  required  for 
conviction.     The  roll   call   revealed   that  forty-nine of the   jurors were   in 
attendance  —   thirty-six Conservatives and  thirteen Republicans.     Because 
Senator   Flythe,   a Republican,   was absent,   thirty-three votes  were  necessary 
for conviction. 































Holden was thus acquitted of the charges in Articles I and II, as had been 
anticipated, but was convicted on the other six counts. If Senator Flythe 
had   been present   to vote   for acquittal,   the Governor would  have been found 
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innocent  of the charges   in Article   IV as well. 
That the  partisan nature of the proceedings was most  apparent  in 
the   final   balloting,   can be  seen readily from the chart on  the  following 
page,  which records   how each member voted  on the   individual   articles.     The 
thirty-six Conservatives  cast   274 of  their   288 votes   for conviction.     Less 
than five   per-cent were  contrary  to party  interests.     Thirty of  the  thirty- 
six Conservatives  voted   "guilty" on every charge.     The  thirteen Republicans 
cast  93  of  their   104 votes   for acquittal.     Over  ten per-cent were  contrary 
to Republican  interest.     The  three  Negro Senators  voted   for  acquittal   on 
every charge,   as did   Senator Olds,   Holden's   son-in-law.     On the other   hand, 
Senators   Lehman and  Moore,   the  two carpetbag members,   cast  only sixty-nine 
per-cent  of  their ballots   for acquittal.     The native Republicans  cast only 
five votes  against   the Governor.     Only on Articles V and  VI,  which concerned 
the writs  of  habeas   corpus ,  was   there a decided majority vote  for  conviction. 
It  is possible   that  had   three Republican Senators  not been replaced  by Con- 
servatives,   Holden would  not  have   been convicted  at all.     Certainly the 
severity of  punishment  would  have  been less. 
Immediately  after  the balloting,   the Impeachment  Court voted  upon 
the  resolution that William W.   Holden,   having been convicted of  six out of 
eight Articles  of  Impeachment,   "be  removed   from the office  of governor and 
be disqualified   from holding  any office of   honor,   trust or  profit under 
the state of  North Carolina."1     Senator Moore,   a Republican,  objecting  to 
the severity  of  the  resolution,  declared   that he would  not  object  to  the 
order  if  it merely pronounced a   judgment  removing  Holden  from his office, 
but that  he  could not,   considering  the evidence,   agree to  so severe a  pen- 
alty as  disqualifying   Holden from holding office  in North Carolina.     Senator 
1Holden,   Impeachment  Proceedings,   III,   2559. 
Final   Balloting of   Impeachment Court* 
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Articles of Impeachment ** Total 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII       G I 
CONSERVATIVES 
Adams G G G G G G G G 8 
Albright G G G G G G G G 8 
Allen G G G G G G G G 8 
Battle G G G G G G G G 8 
Brown G G G G G G G G 8 
Council G G G G G G G G 8 
Crowe11 G G G G G G G G 8 
Currie G G G G G G G G 8 
Dargan G G G G G G G G 8 
Edwards G G G G G G G G 8 
Graham  (Alamance) G G G G G G G G 8 
Graham   (Orange) G G G G G G G G 8 
Jones G G G G G G G G 8 
Latham G G G G G G G G 8 
Ledbetter G G G G G G G G 8 
Linney G G G G G G G G 8 
Love G G G G G G G G 8 
Mauney G G G G G G G G 8 
McClammy G G G G G G G G 8 
Merriman G G G G G G G G 8 
Morehead G G G G G G G G 8 
Murphy G G G G G G G G 8 
Robbins   (Davidson) G G G G G G G G 8 
Robbins   (Rowan) G G G G G G G G 8 
Skinner G G G G G G G G 8 
Troy G G G G G G G G 8 
Waddell G G G G G G G G 8 
Warren G G G G G G G G 8 
Whiteside G G G G G G G G 8 
Worth G G G G G G G G 8 
Gilmer I G G G G G G G 7 1 
Speed I G G G G G G G 7 1 
Norment I G G G G G G 6 2 
Cook I G G G G G 5 3 
Cowles I G G G G G 5 3 
Fleming I G G G I G 4 4 
REPUBLICANS 
Beasley I 8 
Bellamy I 8 
Brogden I 8 
Eppes   (Negro) I 8 
Hyman  (Negro) I 8 
King I 8 
Olds   (son-in-law) I 8 
Price   (Negro) I 8 
Barnett I G 1 7 
Hawkins I G G 2 6 
Leham   (carpetbagger) I G G 2 6 
Moore   (carpetbagger) I G G 3 5 
McCotter I G G G 3 5 
Total  Guilty 30 32 37 33 40 41 36 36 285 
Total   Innocent 19 17 12 16 9 8 13 13 107 
**   •<&■   =  Guiltv         "I"  =   Innocent 
*     In the  preparation of   th is chart  I have relied heavily upon Ewing, 233 
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Cowles, a Conservative who had voted to remove Holden, also felt that the 
disqualifying clause  was  too drastic. 
The vote   on the  order  to remove   Holden from office was  completely 
partisan,   the  thirty-six  Conservatives  voting  for  the  order and  the  thirteen 
Republicans   present voting against  it.     The Conservatives  of  North Carolina 
had achieved  their  objective,   for William Holden,   though only  fifty-  three 
years  old,   was  never again  to be a political   influence   in the   state.     The 
Governor's   arch-enemy,   Josiah Turner,  enthusiastically announced   in the 
Sentinel   the  following day: 
Close of  Impeachment 
Conviction of William W.   Holden on Six of   the  Eight Articles 
GRAND  VINDICATION OF  CIVIL  LIBERTIES 
TARDY  JUSTICE  COMES AT  LAST2 
Governor   Holden had been   impeached  on December  20,   1870,   and  the 
following day he   had turned his office  over   to Lieutenant Governor Tod  R. 
Caldwell.     On December  22,   Holden,   though he   had  never been active   in any 
church,  attended  a Baptist  revival   service  and was   received   into the mem- 
bership of  that  congregation.     On  Sunday evening,   both he and  his wife were 
baptised.     Commenting upon this  sudden   interest  in religion,   the  New York 
Herald wrote:     "Governor   Holden goes   to his   impeachment as   if   he were   going 
to be  hanged."3 
Holden always  contended   that he was   innocent of  the   impeachment 
charges.     As early as  December   21  he declared  that  the   act was  a party 
2The Raleigh Sentinel,   March 23,   1871. 
-^Reprinted   in The Wilmington Journal,   December  23,   1870. 
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measure and no more.     "My opinion,"  he   told one  reporter,   "is   that  they 
[the Conservatives!   intend   to overthrow all  Republican government and 
obtain possession of  every office  from constable up."** 
Holden did not testify in his  own behalf.     Confident at  first of 
acquittal,   he   soon sensed   that  his conviction was  a  foregone conclusion. 
Nevertheless,  he  attended   the  trial   for   the  first eighteen days.     After 
his angry confrontation with Josiah Turner he realized  that the cause was 
lost,   and did  not return.     A few days   later he   left  for Washington D.   C. 
where   he   lived  for almost a year.     The  reason he  gave   for   leaving was   that 
he  had  been asked  to testify before   the   Senate Committee  investigating   the 
Ku Klux   Klan outrages   in the  South.     He worked   through his defense   to  get 
the  trial   prolonged,   believing  his chances  for acquittal would  be   improved 
if  he could do  so.     Nevertheless,   he  wrote   his  wife  that he  took it  for 
granted   that he  would be   found   guilty.5    When Holden was   informed  of  the 
verdict  he was  not  surprised.     His attitude was   that  time would moderate 
the   feeling against  him.     Later  in the year he  wrote  to his   son:     "I   feel 
sure  that   ...   I will ultimately be   fully vindicated."6 
No appropriations  were  allowed   Holden to secure counsel.     He was, 
therefore,  compelled to pay his  own  lawyers  and   in some  instances   to pay 
the expenses of  his own witnesses.     The Managers   had   hired  three of  the 
ablest   lawyers   in the  state  for  fees   of  $1,000 each.     This  forced   Holden 
to  hire counsel  of  the  same caliber at great cost.     He had  to pay William 
Smith and  Edward Conigland $1,000 each and J.   M.   McCarkle   $500.     Richard 
Badger refused any  fee  for his   services. 
^The   New York Herald,   December  21,   1870,     Reprinted  in the  Wilming- 
ton Journal,   December 30,   1870. 
5Holden to  his wife,   March  8,   1871,   The William W.   Holden  Papers, 
Duke  University. 
6Holden to   his  son,  August   11,   1871,   Ibid. 
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Holden  found  it exceedingly difficult   to pay  for  his  counsel   and 
witnesses.     Some   funds  were  collected   for him by Isaac Young and  David 
Jenkins.     He  had   hoped   to receive additional   funds   from northern supporters 
and  friends;   he even wrote  President Grant  about his   financial   plight,   but 
no money was  received.     He was   therefore compelled   to supply the  greater 
part of   the fees   from  his  personal   funds  and  by mortgaging his Raleigh 
residence  for   $2,500. 
During   the entire proceedings,   Chief Justice  Pearson apparently 
presided over  the  trial   in a  fair and   judicious manner,   but  two of Holden's 
counsel,   Nathaniel   Boyden and Richard  Badger,   informed the Governor   later 
that  the  Chief  Justice   had advised  them on matters  of procedure and points 
of  law throughout  the  trial.     According to  both Boyden and  Badger,   Pearson 
had given his  advice  to the   two   individually and without  the  other's  know- 
ledge.     Holden was  careful   to avoid  any contact with Pearson after  the  trial 
began for  fear of embarrassing  the Chief Justice.     Boyden  told   Holden   that 
Pearson  had  informed   him that  the Governor had  the right to declare  a state 
of   insurrection,   and   that the writ of  habeas   corpus,   therefore,   had  been 
legally  suspended.     Holden never ceased  to believe   that Pearson believed 
him to be  innocent. 
After the  trial   had  ended,   Holden was  anxious  to return  to Raleigh, 
but upon the advice of  Edward Conigland  he  remained   in Washington.7     If he 
had returned  to   North Carolina he would   have been involved   in a number of 
court  cases  pending against   him,  and possibly could have  been imprisoned. 
Holden was confident that he  would  be  given assistance  by his 
Republican friends.     He expected some  federal  office  from the  national 
Republican administration,   but  he did not attempt  to force  himself upon 
^Conigland  to  Holden,   May  2,   1871,   Ibid. 
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President Grant  for an  immediate appointment.     He preferred  to wait until 
matters  concerning  his   impeachment were cleared  away,   and  he wanted  to make 
the best  possible arrangements,   both for  the  interest of  his  family and  for 
his   honor  and good   name.     Knowing that he  had   been convicted  by a partisan 
court,   he  hoped ultimately to vindicate  his public  honor. 
The Republicans  offered   Holden two possibilities:     diplomatic   ser- 
vice,  or  the editorship of a new national   newspaper  that  the Republican 
Party hoped  to open in Washington.     Holden refused  two diplomatic  posts, 
and  the   proposed editorship of   the Republican paper did not materialize. 
Instead  he  became   the  political editor of  the Washington Daily Chronicle 
on September   13,   1871,   at   $5,000 a year.     Holden was  successful with  the 
paper and   he  was well   treated   by  the  Republican  leaders,   but he was   not 
satisfied,   for he wanted  to return to  North Carolina and   his  family.     On 
February  29,   1872,   he  gave up his editorship and returned   to Raleigh.     He 
could  not   hold a state   office   but federal  positions were  open  to him.     He 
had  requested and  received  from President Grant an appointment as  post- 
master  in Raleigh.     The appointment was  for  four years  and was  renewed   in 
1877 by President  Hayes.     During his eight years as Postmaster,   Holden 
was a   leader of the Republican Party  in the  state.     In order  that  he not 
harm the   party,   however,   he   limited  his  activities.     Considerable Repub- 
lican opposition developed to   Holden as  Postmaster  because  he did  not  em- 
ploy Negro  clerks.     He  was charged with discrimination,   and  a mass meeting 
on April   2,   1881,   in Raleigh,   called by the Republican   leaders,   drew up a 
set of  resolutions condemning   Holden.     The report charged discrimination 
against  Negroes  and Carpetbaggers  in giving   jobs  at  the  postoffice.     A 
request  was  sent  to President Garfield requesting that   he  not be  reappointed, 
and although he went   to Washington to plead   his own case,   Holden  lost  the 
appointment. 
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Holden began to realize   that the Republican Party had  become   too 
radical   for   him.     On August  31,   1883,  when the Negro question was  becoming 
dominant,   and  his  party seemed  to  be   identified with the colored  race,   he 
announced   through the   Raleigh News  and Observer that  he  was   leaving  the 
Republicans.     The reasons   he gave were  that  the   party advocated  a high 
tariff,   Negro equality,   and   sectionalism  in government.     For  the  rest of 
his   life  he  remained  an independent. 
As   time   lessened  the bitterness  connected with the   impeachment, 
and as   some of  the  actors  passed   from the   stage,  many attempts were made 
to  have  Holden's disabilities   lifted.     Edward  Conigland,   a member of   Hol- 
den's  counsel   in 1871,   took  the   lead   in urging removal,   and   in  1875,   wrote 
to Thomas  Clingman asking  that   the  constitutional   convention pass  resolu- 
tions   favoring  such a step. 
Had   it  not  been for  Holden's  pride,   the disabilities might well 
have  been removed,   but  he  refused  to do anything   in his  own behalf.     He 
was   too proud   to ask   for a   legislative  pardon.     He   insisted   that any  pro- 
posal   to remove  his  disabilities must  come  voluntarily  from the   people with- 
out  opposition from any party.     In   1885 a majority of  the   Senate  pledged 
to vote   for  a  removal   proposal ,   but  Holden requested   that  they drop  the 
question when one   senator  announced   that he would  oppose   the move  in debate. 
The   same  thing happened again  in  1887,   and  as  a result,   Holden's  disabili- 
ties  were  never withdrawn. 
Holden continued   to be  active  in local   affairs until   1889 when he 
suffered  a stroke  of  paralysis.     He  recovered   partially,   but  he  was   left 
almost  blind. 
Shortly before  his  death,   he  began dictating  his  Memoirs   to  his 
daughter  in a   last  attempt  to  vindicate  his name.     While  the  Memoirs   show 
a remarkable  absence of vindictive   feeling,   they  contend   in no uncertain 
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terms that   Holden had  been  innocent  of   the  impeachment charges.     There 
could be   little  question that Holden honestly believed   that  he  had  been 
justified   in the actions   for  which he  had  been impeached.     He wrote  that 
he   had  been aware of   the  grave  responsibility in declaring an insurrection- 
ary  state,   "but  human  life was above  all   price.     I  did not  care  how the 
elections  of  1870 went  if by what  I  did  I   saved one  human  life."8    Holden 
read  the entire   three volumes of  his  Impeachment  Proceedings,  and con- 
cluded:     "I   here and  now declare with the utmost   solemnity  that I  am not 
guilty of   the   charges  preferred  against me.   .   .   .   There  is no person so 
well  qualified   to say I  am not guilty as myself,   I  know I   am not.   .   .   ."9 
Another   theme of  Holden's  Memoirs was  that the  trial   had  been 
thoroughly  partisan.     President Grant  told   Holden that  a number of  his 
jurors were Klansmen.     From another  source  he   learned   that   the Klan dens 
had declared  his  impeachment. 
The intention of the Senate [said Holden] was to have a victim. It was 
believed that if I could be impeached and silenced the Republican Party 
in North Carolina would gradually and  surely cease  to exist. 
I  was   certainly   impeached by party  counsel,   by a party House of 
Representatives and  by a party Senate.10 
Even at  this  advanced  age,   Holden's   loss of state  political   rights 
greatly distressed  him,   for   in spite of all   that was   said  against   him,   he 
was deeply attached   to his   state.     He wrote: 
Only one   thing touching the  proceedings  against me gives me  pain,   and  that 
is  the utterly unfounded  charge   that I  acted corruptly and wickedly and 
in defiance of  the  Constitution and  the   law.     I   love my mother  State,   no 
matter how she  treats me.     I  am satisfied with a sense of my own  integrity. 
8Holden,   Memoirs,   121-122. 
9Ibid.,   147. 
10Ibid.,   161-162. 
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While   I   am hurt by  the   impeachment,   I   am not angered,   I   feel   acutely the 
fact  that I  am pronounced  by my mother   State  an unfit  person to hold  office. 
I  cherish no resentment   toward  any  person for what has  occurred   in the  past. 
I   am at  peace  or would   be,   with all men.'-l 
The day after   the manuscript  of his  Memoirs  was  completed,   Holden 
again was   stricken by  paralysis   and  this   time   he  did  not recover.     For  the 
last year of his   life  his memory  faded and  he was mentally unbalanced. 
Death came quietly  on March 2,   1892,   twenty-one  years  after  his   impeach- 
ment.     No man had  been a more  interesting and  picturesque  figure   in  North 
Carolina history. 
3 
William Holden has   been judged  by history,   as  he was   by the  Sen- 
ate,   sitting as  an  impeachment court,   "as  a tyrannical   governor,   a  poli- 
tical   demagogue,   and  one  who changed  his  political   ties   for  the  sake  of 
ambition."12     The only definitive work that  has  been written about  Holden's 
political   career  has  been done  by  Horace W.   Raper,   and   it  is  unpublished. 
The  historical   profession needs  an objective biography of  Holden.     Now 
that  almost a century has   passed  since his   impeachment,   it  is possible 
to make a non-partisan  study. 
It  is   the opinion of this author  that William  Holden used martial 
law  in  1870  for  the  protection of   the  lives  and   property of   the citizens 
of the  state.     The Governor has  been accused  by a number  of  historians, 
as  he was  by his contemporaries,   of using military  force only  to control 
the August,   1870 elections.     If  this  had  been true  he would   not have   limi- 
ted  his activities  to  two counties.     He  controlled  the elections   only  in 
that  he  attempted  to guarantee   to  the  Negro  the  right  to vote.     Holden did 
11Ibid.   182. 
12Raper,   "Political   Career of  Holden,"   iii. 
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not deserve   impeachment.     He was  a political  opportunist,   but he also  felt 
the   responsibility   to  protect   life  and property   in the state.     Had he   known 
that his  actions would  result   in the  destruction of his  party,   he  probably 
would not  have   taken  such drastic measures,   but  that   is not a question here. 
As  a two-thirds majority of the   impeachment court voted,   a state  of   in- 
surrection did exist.     The Governor   took  the  only recourse  that was   left 
to him,   if  peace  and  order were  to be restored.     The  other charges  against 
Holden cannot be  upheld   if one  accepts,   as   the court did,   that  an   insur- 
rectionary state existed.     Yet   these  are   the charges  upon which his   re- 
moval   from office  was   based.     Necessity alone would have   justified his 
actions.     Some  of  the more disagreeable  aspects   of  the attempt  to suppress 
the  Ku  Klux Klan could   have  been avoided,   but   they were   insignificant   in 
comparison to the  atrocities  of  the  Klan. 
No matter what  had been the Governor's  motives   in using martial 
law,   he did  the  proper   thing.     Even  if he  had  acted   to assure  Republican 
ascendency,   the   important  thing  is   that measures were  taken to end  the 
depredations of   the  Klan.     Yet  for  attempting to protect  the   life and  pro- 
perty of a minority  group, Governor  Holden was   removed  from office and 
forbidden ever again to  serve  his   state. 
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